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Abstract
Wi-Fi authentication mechanisms include central authentication, dynamic and dis-
tributed authentication and some encryption methods. Most of the existing au-
thentication methods were designed for single-hop networks, as opposed to multi-
hop Wi-Fi mesh networks.
This research endeavors to characterize and compare existing Wi-Fi authen-
tication mechanisms to find the best secure connection mechanism associated with
Wi-Fi mesh network fragmentation and distributed authentication. The method-
ology is experimental and empirical, based on actual network testing. This thesis
characterizes five different types of Wrt54gl firmware, three types of Wi-Fi routing
protocols, and besides the eight Wi-Fi mesh network authentication protocols re-
lated to this research, it also characterizes and compares 14 existing authentication
protocols.
Most existing authentication protocols are not applicable to Wi-Fi mesh net-
works since they are based on Layer 2 of the OSI model and are not designed
for Wi-Fi mesh networks. We propose using TincVPN which provides distributed
authentication, fragmentation, and can provide secure connections for backbone
Wi-Fi mesh networks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Wireless fidelity (Wi-Fi) networks have become ubiquitous but are mostly depen-
dent on central access points or routers. Wi-Fi mesh networks extend a Wi-Fi
network’s accessibility. Authentication on single-hop Wi-Fi networks has been
standardized. We tackle the problems of authentication in multi-hop Wi-Fi mesh
networks in this thesis. Besides describing the background to the thesis in Sec-
tion 1.1, this chapter motivates the thesis topic in Section 1.2 and poses research
questions in Section 1.3. The approach of the thesis regarding methods, design
of and implementation of the project is discussed in Section 1.4 and the complete
thesis is outlined in Section 1.5.
1.1 Background
Wireless networks can provide easy and inexpensive network connections for differ-
ent environments (Akyildiz and Wang, 2005). Providing network connections for
cities is not very difficult. We can provide urban network connections with cables
as well, but networks with cables can be very difficult to install in rural areas. As
wireless networks can easily provide network connectivity for rural and difficult
environments, and can bridge the digital gap between rural and urban areas, they
are more cost efficient and scalable than wired networks. For these reasons wire-
less networks have become very popular in recent years (Galperin, 2005). Wireless
network equipment is available in most countries. Worldwide over 200 companies
provide wireless networking equipment (Fourty et al., 2005).
Wireless networks are based on different technologies, such as Wi-Fi and wire-
less interoperability for microwave access (WiMAX) that can be used in diverse
areas for various purposes. We will focus on Wi-Fi technology in this thesis. There
are different types of wireless network based on their range, such as wireless local
area networks (WLANs), wireless personal area networks (WPANs), and wireless
1
 
 
 
 
2metropolitan area networks (WMANs) and Wi-Fi (Fourty et al., 2005). Wireless
networks are a promising network technology. They have been widely used in devel-
oped countries. Therefore, due to their good performance and low cost, developing
countries have also been motivated to use wireless networks (Pentland et al., 2004).
There are many standards defined by the Institute of Electrical and Elec-
tronics Engineers (IEEE) for wireless networks. These standards include IEEE
802.11/a/b/g/n and 802.16. The term Wi-Fi, generally used for the IEEE 802.11
standard, is a very popular wireless technology. By 2005 42 million Wi-Fi devices
had been installed worldwide. Wi-Fi is designed for short distance coverage. It
can be distributed in ad-hoc, peer-to-peer, and wireless mesh networks (Akyildiz
and Wang, 2005).
Currently Afghanistan has 24 governmental universities, and in 2010 18 of
these 24 universities already use wireless networks. The Ministry of Higher Ed-
ucation in Afghanistan (MoHE) installed WiMAX for campus-to-campus connec-
tions and Wi-Fi for on site connections between faculties (MoHE Afghanistan,
2010). The one laptop per child (OLPC) projects that are running for Afghanistan
schools (OLPC, 2009), and Village Telco project running in the Bo-kaap in Cape
Town and Dili in East Timor, are the some examples of Wi-Fi mesh networks in
developing countries (Song, 2011). A good example of a mesh network applied in
a developed country is the use of Freifunk in Berlin (Johnson, 2007).
User access management of Wi-Fi mesh networks is more difficult than for
wired and wireless networks, because the data in wireless mesh networks is trans-
ferred through different devices and over networks whose structure is under con-
tinual change. Wi-Fi mesh networks (WMNs) are more complex than Wi-Fi in-
frastructure networks and user access control in WMNs is very critical (Akyildiz
and Wang, 2005). Wi-Fi networks have different modes, such as point-to-point or
peer-to-peer mode, point-to-multi-point or infrastructure mode and multi-point-to-
multi-point or meshed mode (Flickenger et al., 2006, p. 54). Each of the Wi-Fi
network modes requires a specific mechanism for user access management.
Wireless mesh networks do not have a single point of failure, because if one
node experiences a failure another node can be used to pass data. Therefore, wire-
less mesh networks have better redundancy, reliability, scalability, and flexibility
than other types of wireless network. Wi-Fi mesh networks are composed of mesh
nodes and mesh clients. Nodes act like a backbone which is connected to clients
 
 
 
 
3and other nodes. Each client acts as a router that can pass data to other clients
and nodes. The resulting network can transmit data over long distances (Flick-
enger et al., 2006, pp. 51–56). Wi-Fi mesh networks are very similar to ad-hoc
networks (Schollmeier et al., 2002). However ad hoc networks are peer-to-peer
networks that do not need any backbone.
The reasons for the popularity of wireless mesh networks include their easy
installation, scalability, cost effective deployment, high redundancy, availability,
reliability and low cost (Tsai and Chen, 2005). Often wireless mesh networks are
deployed in high density areas and areas where cabling is impractical.
An unmeshed Wi-Fi network uses an access point (AP) as a central device
for communication between network users. Each AP needs to be connected to a
wired network as a backhaul, so it has a single point of failure, a higher cost and
less scalability than a Wi-Fi mesh network. Nevertheless, in Wi-Fi mesh networks
only some nodes need to be connected to a wired network, in order to provide
Internet services. There are two types of mesh nodes in the Wi-Fi mesh network
namely:
• Transient access points (TAPs): Nodes with no wired Internet connection.
They simply forward the data from one node to other nodes.
• Hot spots : Nodes having a wired Internet connection that can pass data to
the Internet.
There are two types of mesh network: the partial mesh network and the
full mesh network. A partial mesh network is a mesh network between routers to
routers or clients to clients. A full mesh network is a mesh network between all
routers and clients. A mesh network may be composed of several ad-hoc networks.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the structure of an ad-hoc network and Figure 1.2 shows the
structure of a mesh network.
Wi-Fi mesh networks have several benefits. Most of these benefits are related
to self-management features of mesh networks. Wi-Fi mesh networks enable self-
managing systems. Self-management consists of self-configuration, self-tuning, self-
healing, and self-monitoring (Flickenger et al., 2006; Akyildiz and Wang, 2005).
Overall Wi-Fi mesh networks look very promising compared with other stan-
dards of wireless networks, even though the security and performance of Wi-Fi
mesh networks need some improvement. Different methods have been introduced
 
 
 
 
4for wireless network security, such as encryption of data flowing through the net-
work, user access management by filtering the MAC addresses and IP addresses of
devices, and user access management by authentication (Flickenger et al., 2006).
However, the existing security policies and user access management cannot neces-
sarily provide guarantees on a wireless mesh network.
Figure 1.1: An ad-hoc network
Ad-hoc Wi-Fi and Wi-Fi mesh networks are a confusing topic. Ad-hoc Wi-Fi
networks are networks where clients such as laptops, PDAs or sensors transfer data
to neighboring nodes to form arbitrary network topologies. If we have mobility
in such networks, they form a network class known as a mobile ad hoc network
(MANET). The Wi-Fi topology can change rapidly in MANET network. Wireless
sensor networks are a good example of a static Wi-Fi ad-hoc network. Static Wi-
Fi mesh networks have dedicated and static wireless routers and clients that carry
out the function of routing packets through the networks. Broadband community
wireless networks or municipal wireless networks are good examples of Wi-Fi mesh
networks (Johnson et al., 2008). The provision of authentication and security
can therefore be challenging in static and mobile mesh networking. Our research
covers efficient user access mechanisms in infrastructure or backbone Wi-Fi mesh
networks. The hardware, software and wireless routing protocol selection process
is also important, because these technologies are related to each other.
We are mainly concerned with wireless mesh network routing protocols.
 
 
 
 
5Figure 1.2: A mesh network
Wireless mesh routing protocols provide the connection facilities, select the best
route for packages and transfer the packages to those neighboring mesh points.
There are several routing protocols for wireless and wireless mesh networks such
as topology broadcast based on reverse-path forwarding (TBRPF), dynamic source
routing (DSR), extremely opportunistic routing (ExOR), optimized link-state rout-
ing (OLSR), ad-hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV), and better approach to
mobile ad-hoc networking (BATMAN).
BATMAN, OLSR and AODV, are the most well-known Wi-Fi mesh routing
protocols which are used in the OpenWrt, Freifunk, and DD-WRT. We discuss the
characteristics of these protocols briefly below, and review them in more detail in
Chapter 4 with respect to authentication mechanisms.
AODV
AODV is a distance vector routing protocol used for mobile ad-hoc networks that
can be adapted dynamically. AODV uses resources efficiently and works with slow
processors and at low network speeds. AODV is dynamically self starting, uses
multi-hop routing and can establish links quickly. It is loop free and converges
quickly. AODV uses three types of user datagram protocol (UDP) messages: route
request, route reply, and route error for communication between ad-hoc nodes (Sun
 
 
 
 
6et al., 2003).
AODV is a reactive routing protocol which can find the route when it needs to
send packets somewhere. AODV considers the shortest route as the best one. But
sometimes the shortest route has more delay, more latency and can use more band-
width. Usually it is used in small networks because in bigger networks repeated
route discovery causes more error reports which results in the loss of bandwidth.
The AODV protocol does not employ a system of multipoint relays (MPRs). The
lack of MPRs results in multi-route advertisement and this results in repeated
route discovery and overhead in the network. The AODV protocol needs to dis-
cover the route first in order to send the actual data, so the search latency affects
the AODV protocol and increases the overhead. The AODV protocol works better
in networks with static traffic, and few wireless source and destination points. In
bigger networks some other routing protocols are preferable in order to be able to
manage more routes and more resources, and in order to consider the best route
based on the state of the links (Huhtonen, 2004).
OLSR
OLSR is a wireless network routing protocol which is based on the concept of a link
state routing protocol, where each node selects a set of its neighboring MPR nodes
to reduce the overhead. The topology of wireless networks continually changes
and a routing protocol needs to be compatible with a changeable structure. In
the MPR concept, the host must have information about more than one neighbor
symmetrically. The MPR is responsible for controlling the traffic during the for-
warding of data. OLSR also relies on the MPR calculation to select the shortest
path. OLSR has a list of routes with high priority and another list of routes for
redundancy and load balancing.
A topology control message is broadcast to all nodes and only the MPR
is allowed to forward the message to others. In an OLSR topology, each MPR
needs to have at least two neighbors to exchange the message. The message has a
sequence number. The message with the highest number has been updated more
than others. If a node gets a message with a smaller sequence number then it will
be discarded automatically (Clausen and Jacquet, 2003).
The screenshot in Figure 1.3 shows the topology of OLSR for four routers
included in the backbone of the experimental network we used for our research
 
 
 
 
7which will be addressed in more detail in Section 3.4.2 on mesh network design.
Figure 1.3: OLSR topology
OLSR reduces the overhead of a network because it works with MPRs and
MPRs are the only points that can forward messages. Since OLSR maintains the
entire route in the routing table, it needs more powerful hardware than AODV.
OLSR is mostly used for dense wireless networks such as schools, airports, hospitals
and hostels (Ge et al., 2003).
OLSR produces higher routing efficiency than AODV because the updates
are done periodically and no additional overhead occurs for finding new routes. In
OLSR the overhead is independent of the traffic profiles, so it has a fixed upper
bound for the overhead in a network regardless of the network’s traffic. OLSR
uses more bandwidth and resources than AODV. Thus, OLSR cannot be used
in resource critical solutions (Ge et al., 2003). OLSR does not need to do extra
work for the discovery of the route so it provides low single packet transmission
latency (Huishan et al., 2003).
The one great advantage of the OLSR protocol is that it knows the status of
the link and it is possible to extend the quality of service information using this
protocol, but AODV does not have this facility (Ge et al., 2003).
BATMAN
Control of the packet and routing in wireless mesh networks is different from other
ad-hoc types of network, because wireless mesh networks tend to have less mobility
 
 
 
 
8than other types of ad-hoc network. In wireless mesh networks the route changes
less than in ad-hoc or mobile ad-hoc networks. BATMAN, which like OLSR, is
a proactive routing protocol for establishing multi-hop routes in mobile ad-hoc
networks. In this protocol each node maintains information only about the best
next hop towards all other nodes, which avoids unnecessary knowledge about the
global topology and reduces the signaling overhead.
Based on the BATMAN algorithm, mesh nodes broadcast a hello packet
to inform neighbor nodes about their existence. The neighbors rebroadcast the
hello packet to inform their neighbors about the existence of this node. These
small packets contain the address of the original node, the address of the node
rebroadcasting the packet, a time to live (TTL) and a sequence number. Each
node rebroadcasts this packet at most once and only if it is received by the current
best next hop towards the original initiator of the packet. BATMAN does not
maintain the full route to the destination. Each node along the route maintains
the information only about the next link through which the best route can be found.
BATMAN never checks the quality of the links, it just checks the link existence.
The links are compared in terms of the number of hello packets that have been
received within the current sliding window. So the overhead of BATMAN is much
less than OLSR (Johnson et al., 2008).
1.2 Motivation
Wireless mesh networks have proven to be cost effective. They have self man-
agement features, and they are more extendable than other types of wireless net-
works. Wireless mesh networks do not need extra network administrator inter-
action. Wireless mesh networks are used mostly in dense areas such as schools,
airports, hospitals and hostels. The strategic plans (MoHE Afghanistan, 2010)
of the Afghanistan ministry of higher education and ministry of education are to
equip schools and university campuses with computers and Internet access to im-
prove the education and research quality. Wireless mesh networks are a promising
technology for these environments and most of the universities in Afghanistan are
already connected using wireless networks.
Freifunk firmware is open source Linux-based firmware which can can be
adapted as needed. For example, it can be localized by changing the English or
 
 
 
 
9German interface of Freifunk to Dari to make it easier to understand in Afghanistan.
The Freifunk project which started in Berlin is a good example of using wireless
for mesh networks. The OLPC project in Afghanistan uses Freifunk . A team of
software developers are working to localize this firmware for use in small laptops in
schools in Afghanistan (OLPC, 2009). Later we will explain how Freifunk firmware
can provide us with valuable insights into the practical application of WMNs.
It follows that security in wireless mesh networks is a big challenge.
1.3 Research questions
Wi-Fi mesh networks are a promising approach to networking in addition to non-
mesh wireless networks, but user access management of mesh networks is more
difficult. There are many mechanisms for user access management on wireless
infrastructure mode networks, such as filtering mechanisms, cryptographic proto-
cols, and authentication protocols to control the access of users. Each of them
has advantages and disadvantages. In our research we characterize and compare
the existing cryptographic protocols, basic user access management, and authen-
tication mechanisms for infrastructure mode wireless to identify options for Wi-Fi
mesh networks.
The goal of our research is to determine the best authentication mechanism
to address the problem of Wi-Fi mesh network authentication using open source
software and protocols. To deal with authentication protocols that address secure
access of Wi-Fi mesh networks we need to answer the following questions.
1. How can we characterize the existing Wi-Fi authentication mechanisms?
We did a literature review and feasibility study to answer this question. We
compared 5 types of firmware for the Linksys Wrt54gl router to investigate
their authentication capabilities and we characterized 14 types of authenti-
cation mechanisms to answer this question. However they do not work for
Wi-Fi mesh networks. The reasons are detailed in Chapter 2.
2. What is the best option to pursue for Wi-Fi mesh network authentication?
We designed and installed real mesh networks, tested several authentication
protocols, and collected results to answer the second question. We also tried
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to implement two specific solutions. We describe the results and efforts in
detail in Chapter 4, based on methods described in Chapter 3.
Both questions are important for this study because in order to understand
the existing authentication methods it is important to analyze existing au-
thentications. The authentication methods are summarized in Chapter 4 in
Table 4.6. Furthermore, understanding the similarities, differences, capabili-
ties and limitations of existing authentication mechanisms, is important for
identifying the best one for wireless mesh networks.
1.4 Overall approach
Most of the research in ad-hoc and mesh networks have been carried out using
simulation tools such as NS2 and a packet tracer (Andel and Yasinac, 2006). This
has the disadvantage that most of the simulation tools are limited by the physical
layer and do not fully support all the types of protocols which we needed in our
research. The simulations do not always reveal which implementations in the
network do not work in real networks. For example connecting wireless devices
to a packet tracer is much easier in a real mesh network because most of the
configuration is done automaticaly. We did our research using real infrastructure
in a mesh network with five Wrt54gl routers and one Laptop computer.
As mentioned in Section 1.3, the aim of this thesis is to pursue an authenti-
cation mechanism that addresses secure connections in Wi-Fi mesh networks. We
focus on analyzing existing authentication mechanisms, comparing the capabilities
and limitations of authentication protocols and finding the most appropriate of
those authentication protocols to improve the security of Wi-Fi mesh networks.
Our methodology is discussed in depth in Chapter 3.
We used the wireless Linksys Wrt54gl router, because it has open source
firmware that we can adapt. During our experimentation we tested 14 types of
authentication mechanisms, used the freeRADIUS server as authentication server,
we used VPN, and we used five types of firmware. We used the openssl library
as a certification authority (CA). We employed five Linksys Wrt54gl routers, with
several wireless clients for implementing and verifying these protocols. Finally, we
propose Freifunk firmware, the OLSR routing protocol, TincVPN , and openssl
for securing connections and user access management.
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1.5 Thesis outline
This section outlines the entire thesis as a guide for the reader. The thesis is or-
ganized in five chapters. This introductory chapter gives a background of wireless
mesh networks and authentication in wireless mesh networks in Section 1.1, intro-
duces the motivation in Section 1.2, the research questions in Section 1.3 and the
overall approach in Section 1.4.
Chapter 2 discuses related work focusing on Wi-Fi infrastructure and Wi-
Fi mesh network authentication protocols. Section 2.1 covers 14 types of infras-
tructure Wi-Fi authentication protocols and Section 2.2 discusses the Wi-Fi mesh
network authentication protocols and describes central authentication mechanisms
and distributed authentication mechanisms for Wi-Fi mesh networks as proposed
by several researchers such as Lee et al. (2008), Luo et al. (2004) and by Thompson
et al. (2007).
Chapter 3 goes into the methodology and Section 3.4 describes the experimen-
tal designed of Wi-Fi and Wi-Fi mesh network. Section 3.5 discusses the firmware
choices for Linksys Wrt54gl routers, Section 3.6 describe the protocol modification,
Section 3.7 summarizes the contents of Chapter 3.
Chapter 4 covers the analysis of the thesis using several tables for compar-
ison. Section 4.1 characterizes firmware and routing protocols in Tables 4.1–4.2.
Section 4.2 discusses and tabulates authentication protocols in Tables 4.3–4.7 and
Section 4.3 covers the protocols that are used with EAP in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7.
TincVPN also detailed in this chapter.
Chapter 5 summarizes the entire thesis in Section 5.1. Section 5.1.4 points out
the result of thesis. Section 5.1.5 discusses the conclusions the thesis. Section 5.2
points out the limitation of proposed authentication protocols and Section 5.3
discusses the future work.
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Related work
This chapter covers work related to authentication mechanisms for wireless mesh
networks. The chapter contains a survey of authentication mechanisms for Wi-Fi
networks primarily for infrastructure mode. Researchers have proposed different
kinds of authentication protocols for Wi-Fi mesh networks. We discuss and ana-
lyze those proposed authentication protocols in this chapter. Section 2.1 discusses
14 types of Wi-Fi network authentication protocols. Section 2.2 discusses Wi-Fi
mesh network protocols, centralized authentication protocols based on certificate
authentication and distributed authentication. Section 2.3 summarizes this chapter
on related work.
2.1 802.11 authentication mechanisms
Access to Wi-Fi networks should be controlled by a strong policy that defines
their accessibility. Different methods are used for controlling user access in Wi-Fi
networks and each of these methods has benefits and drawbacks. Authentication
is a method used to control the access of users to the network. Access rights for
those users who are allowed to use the network can be pre-assigned, and different
authentication methods for Wi-Fi networks handle this in different ways.
Sections 2.1.1–2.1.14 discuss basic user access control, cryptographic proto-
cols, and several authentication protocols. Each of these help in controlling access
to Wi-Fi networks. Keeping in mind that different encryption and authentication
capabilities depend on different firmware, we analyze several existing standards
based on different firmware. Firewall based security, VPN and patching are also
used for the security of Wi-Fi networks. Most network administrators use a com-
bination of them in one Wi-Fi network.
There are various methods for access management of users in Wi-Fi networks.
Sections 2.2.1–2.2.2 overview some well known methods of user access management
13
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for Wi-Fi networks.
2.1.1 Closed network
A closed network is a mechanism that gives access only to those who know the
service set identifier (SSID) of the Wi-Fi network. Since the inception of closed
networks, IEEE 802.11 has provided security mechanisms to reduce the potential
security threat this extra freedom brings, e.g. IEEE 802.11 APs, or sets of APs,
can be configured with a single SSID, which is known to the network interface card
(NIC) in order to associate it with an AP and then continue with data transmission
and reception on the network. Whether the association is allowed when the SSID is
unknown can be controlled by the NIC/driver locally without using any encryption.
This is a very weak security system because the SSID is known by all NICs and
APs and the SSID is transmitted over the network in clear text.
A closed network mechanism was introduced to decrease these threats. Nor-
mally routers and access points broadcast the enhanced service set identifier (ES-
SID) or SSID many times to the clients that are served by an AP/router. Clients
can easily find this AP/router based on the SSID. In a closed network router/access
points do not broadcast the SSID of the network to clients, and each client who
wants to access the network should know the complete name or code of the SSID.
Otherwise, the user cannot get access to the network. The good point of this
method is to allow only those who know the SSID to use the network.
Closed networks also have drawbacks. Other network administrators do not
know which channel is already in use in this environment. Therefore, a closed
network can cause interference to other networks in the same environment. When
a legal user types the SSID, malicious users can sniff the packet that is exchanged
between the router/access point and the client because it is in clear text. Forgetting
the SSID leads to administrative problem for users and administrator (Flickenger
et al., 2006).
2.1.2 MAC address Filtering
The media access control (MAC) address is a 48-bit address which is hard coded
in the NIC of each network device. This address can be used to control user access
to the network. Router or access points can keep a list of client MAC addresses
and when a client tries to access the network, the client MAC address is matched
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with the MAC address database as is illustrated in Figure 2.1. If the MAC address
is found, access to the network is granted, otherwise, access is denied. However, it
is not a very secure method because malicious users can spoof a MAC address.
This method works well for small networks and temporary solutions. For
example, a computer that generates viruses can be included in the black list and
its connections can be denied. However, for large networks, it is difficult to keep
an updated list of MAC address that are allowed to use the network or are denied
access to the network, because we can assign only a limited number of client MAC
addresses in the filter lists (Flickenger et al., 2006). MAC address filtering can also
work in point-to-point mesh networks because blockage of connections of any mesh
router can be performed even if that router has other related clients.
Figure 2.1: MAC address filtering system
2.1.3 Password Authentication
The password authentication protocol (PAP) is a simple authentication protocol
that is used for remote authentication servers. Almost all of the network oper-
ating systems support PAP. PAP transmits a username and password across the
network unencrypted and it is a point-to-point protocol. Figure 2.2 illustrates the
PAP authentication process. PAP is an insecure protocol compared with newer
protocols, because it does not have an encryption system. In the PAP method, the
user sends an access request packet containing a username and password together
to the authentication server, then the authentication server validates the username
and password or rejects the request (Kim and Choi, 2004).
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When PAP is used with wireless networks, it should not be used alone, but
rather with other authentication methods such as tunnel transport layer proto-
col security (TTLS) to ensure that the password is not revealed. In 2006, the Ma
group (Ma et al., 2006) reworked PAP and developed another version of PAP called
M-PAP. PAP and M-PAP were mostly used in Wi-Fi point-to-point authentica-
tion. M-PAP has integrated security and is better than PAP. However, M-PAP
still has drawbacks. For example, it is vulnerable to off-line password guessing
attacks (Yoon and Yoo, 2006). Even Yoon and Yoo’s paper was soon shown to
be flawed by Lee et al. who showed that Yoon and Yoo’s protocol is vulnerable
to both the off-line password guessing attack and to the replay attack (Lee et al.,
2007).
3:
Figure 2.2: The PAP authentication process
2.1.4 CHAP: Challenge-handshake authentication protocol
The challenge-handshake authentication protocol (CHAP) was originally designed
for wired networks. A version of CHAP is proprietary to Microsoft but has a doc-
umented and updated RFC as well (Lloyd and Simpson, 1996, RFC 1334). CHAP
is a three way handshake authentication protocol that is used by the authentica-
tion server to identity the remote client that wants to access the network. CHAP
performs the following steps:
1. After the link control protocol (LCP) phase is complete, and CHAP has been
negotiated between both devices, the authenticator sends a challenge message
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to the peer.
2. The peer responds with a value calculated using a one-way hash function.
3. The authenticator checks the response against its own calculation of the
expected hash value. If the values match, the authentication is successful,
otherwise, the connection is terminated.
4. The authenticator sends a new challenge to its peers randomly and then steps
1–3 are repeated.
The client is authenticated during the initial link establishment phase and
the process is repeated until the source and destination are disconnected. Veri-
fication of point-to-point nodes is based on the device host name and password,
and also uses a hash value. In the CHAP system, the user sends an access request
together with a password to the authentication server, but without a username,
while in the PAP method the user sends the request packet with a username and a
password (Simpson, 1996, RFC 1994). CHAP has a variable challenge value, and
uses repeated challenges, and it can prevent attacks because it has complete control
over access and authentication. CHAP has a one-way authentication system that
requires a plain text password because an encrypted password database cannot be
used so it is not suitable for large networks.
Advantages of CHAP
CHAP changes the hashed-key identifier periodically. The use of repeated chal-
lenges can reduce the vulnerability of networks. The authenticator is in control of
the frequency and timing of the challenges. This authentication method depends
upon a “secret” known only to the authenticator and the specific peer. The secret
is not sent over the link. Although the authentication is only one-way, by negoti-
ating CHAP in both directions the same set of secret keys may easily be used for
mutual authentication. Since CHAP may be used to authenticate many different
systems, name fields may be used as an index to locate the proper secret in a large
table of secrets. This also makes it possible to support more than one name or
secret pair per system, and to change the secret in use at any time during the
session (Lloyd and Simpson, 1996, RFC 1334).
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Disadvantages of CHAP
CHAP requires that the secret be available in plain text form and an encrypted
password database cannot be used. It is not useful for large installations, since
every possible secret is maintained at both ends of the link. CHAP is not a mutual
authentication protocol and is therefore not suitable for multi-hop networks (Lloyd
and Simpson, 1996, RFC 1334).
2.1.5 Shared key authentication
Shared key and open system are the two oldest authentication mechanisms for IEEE
802.11 standard. “Open system authentication” does no authentication because
each client that is in the wireless coverage area can access and can use the network.
“Shared key authentication” does its authentication by using wired equivalent pri-
vacy (WEP) encryption. In this method, the router or access point broadcasts
its SSID to the coverage environment using a 128-bit random number. All clients
that are in the coverage area can detect the wireless network, but each client that
has the shared key can access the network otherwise it will be denied. If the client
sends the key to the router or access point, and the shared key is correct then client
is allowed to access the network or else it will be denied. Figure 2.3 shows the open
system authenticatiom mechanism. The process of shared key authentication is a
four-way handshake, illustrated in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.3: Open system authentication
Shared keys have some limitations as well. The attacker just needs the shared
key, which can be found in different ways—maybe from a disloyal user or by inter-
cepting the packet that passes between clients and nodes. No mutual authentica-
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tion method is available where the user does not have clear information that he /
she is connected to the right network or not. All of the users use the same shared
key. When the shared key needs to be changed an advertisement will be made to
all of the legitimate users. Shared key authentication has been deprecated since
2004 by the IEEE standard (IEEE Std 802.11i, 2004, Page 34).
Encryption is another mechanism for user access management, and provides
better security for wireless networks, several cryptographic protocols already exist
which we cover in Sections 2.1.6–2.1.8.
2.1.6 WEP: Wired equivalent privacy
Wired equivalent privacy (WEP) is the first encryption protocol which was used
for wireless network security. It encrypts the data which is exchanged between
router/access point and clients using a symmetric key algorithm. WEP has two
types of key, a 64-bit key and a 128-bit key. 24 bits are occupied by the initialization
vector (IV) which is transmitted as clear text, and the other 40 bits of the 64-bit
key or 104 bits of the 128-bit key are occupied by the actual key used in WEP. After
altering 24 bits to the IV in every new data frame it is passed together with the
shared key to the Rivest cipher 4 (RC4) algorithm to generate a pseudo random
stream.
RC4 is used in the WEP encryption method, and the cyclic redundancy check
(CRC-32) encodes and decodes the data for integrity purposes. The packet passed
from from the NIC to the router has three major parts: (1) the initialization vector,
(2) the actual data and an integrity check value (ICV), and (3) the actual data
and the ICV encrypted by CRC-32.
WEP provides two types of authentication for user access management to the
network: (1) open system authentication mechanisms and (2) shared key authenti-
cation mechanisms. In open system authentication the client does not need any key
during authentication and after authentication. WEP is used for encrypting the
frame and in this case the client requires a key. The shared key authentication that
WEP uses is a four-way handshake for authentication, that is shown in Figure 2.4.
1. The client sends an authentication request to the AP/Router.
2. The router or access point returns a clear text challenge.
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3. The client has to encrypt the challenge text using the WEP key and send it
back in another authentication request.
4. The AP/router decrypts the packet and sends a positive or negative response
to the client.
Figure 2.4: The WEP shared key authentication process
WEP has some weaknesses as well. 24 bits of IV is in clear text and it is not
a very big number. After passing 224 = 16777216 packets, the use and reuse of
the same key pose the main problem of WEP. An attacker can easily find the IV
key by capturing 224 packets. Weak keys for RC4 algorithm pose another problem
for WEP. The cracker can easily crack this key using AIRCRACK, software that is
freely available. It has several tools for breaking the WEP key, such as AIRPLAY.
It has some tools that can capture network frames and can easily find the WEP
key (Maple et al., 2006; Rigney et al., 2000, RFC 2865). WEP has been deprecated
since 2004 by the IEEE standard (IEEE Std 802.11i, 2004, Page iv).
2.1.7 WPA: Wi-Fi protected access
Wi-Fi protected access (WPA) is an encryption and authentication method in Wi-
Fi networks that was developed by the Wi-Fi Alliance to solve the security problems
of WEP. WPA was developed by the 802.11i working group, and works with all
the IEEE 802.11/a/b/g standards.
The temporal key integrity protocol (TKIP) is a key scheduling algorithm
concept which is used in WPA. In the real world WPA is an enhanced type of
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WEP. WPA not only provides strong data encryption to correct WEP weaknesses,
but it adds user authentication which was largely missing in WEP as well (LaRosa,
2004).
The CRC-32 algorithm that was used for WEP has been replaced with mes-
sage integrity code (MIC) for data integrity and header integrity on WPA. Based
on WPA, a 128-bit dynamic key is used by the RC4 algorithm to finalize the en-
cryption, and 64 bits are used for authentication. WPA can use both shared and
private keys for authentication, it employs 802.1X authentication with one of the
standard extensible authentication protocol (EAP) types as well. WPA can also
use a third party database such as remote authentication dial in user service (RA-
DIUS). While WPA is more secure then WEP, it also possible to crack it by using
the cloud service WPA Cracker on the www.wpacracker.com website. It uses a
brute-force dictionary-based attack which can check the captured network traffic
using its cluster of 400 CPUs and 135 million word dictionary set up for WPA
passwords in 20 minutes—at a cost of $17. The same job is still feasible on a
fast quad-core PC and should take only a few days. On our 1.4GHz notebook we
can check 16–18 passwords/second. It is therefore recommended that pass phrases
should be at least 20 characters long and not contain any dictionary words.
Both WPA and WPA2—see Section 2.1.8—are vulnerable to denial of service
(DoS) attacks. WPA has a technique that if a host receives at least two wrong
packets sent per second from a router or AP the WPA shuts down the network.
Nevertheless malicious users can take advantage of this because the WPA shuts
down the network for a minute and during this time all the links are disconnected.
WPA and WPA2 both have two modes, namely enterprise mode and per-
sonal mode. Enterprise mode uses a RADIUS server for authentication, and IEEE
802.1X/EAP to process the information. WPA enterprise mode is mostly used on
bigger networks. WPA personal mode is used for home and small networks. It
uses a combination of pre-shared key (PSK), TKIP and MIC (Maple et al., 2006).
WPA-PSK can be hacked by coWPAtty tools. Cracking of WPA-PSK is done
by systematically testing numerous passwords and combinations of characters. It
is estimated that on a Pentium 4 3.8GHz system, coWPAtty can try 70 words per
second, however it would take over 3452 days to test all the possible eight letter
passwords (over 208×109 combinations) if they are not in a dictionary. Therefore,
WPA has stronger encryption than WEP (Acharya et al., 2009), but as we have
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pointed out before WPA is vulnerable to attack by cloud clusters.
2.1.8 WPA2: Wi-Fi protected access II
Wi-Fi protected access II (WPA2) was introduced in September 2004. It was
developed by the 802.11i working group. WPA2 was created to replace the RC4
algorithm and its weaknesses by using a strong encryption algorithm. WPA2 uses
the advanced encryption standard (AES) for data encryption, and the Counter
mode with cipher block chaining message authentication code protocol (CCMP) for
data integrity and header integrity, it is more secure than WEP and WPA. The
AES algorithm needs only 128 bits for authentication and EAP is used as the
protocol for key management and centralized mutual authentication (Maple et al.,
2006).
The personal version of WPA is typically referred to as WPA-PSK or WPA2-
PSK, which is a fancy term for a password. The Enterprise versions are commonly
referred to as WPA-RADIUS and WPA2-RADIUS because they require a RA-
DIUS server employing one of five different EAP standards, which are described
in Sections 2.1.10–2.1.14.
Authentication is a process that takes place between a client and an AP/router
that can be based on CA or based a on filtering mechanism (Huber and Jordan,
2005). It is a process that identifies authorized and unauthorized users. Each wire-
less user who wants to access a wireless network should be controlled by a network
administrator. With a good access mechanism, isolation of the legal and illegal
users and prevention of network attacks can be performed. Different mechanisms
exist for authentication in a wireless network. Each of these has benefits and some
weaknesses (Akyildiz and Wang, 2005). PAP, CHAP, IEEE 802.1X, EAP, EAP-
TLS, and EAP-TTLS are the most well-known protocols that are used in wireless
networks. The remainder of this section covers EAP and its extensions.
2.1.9 EAP: Extensible authentication protocol—IEEE 802.1X
EAP is a flexible protocol that works with other authentication protocols. It can
support and can get help from other upper layer authentication protocols, such as
transport layer security (TLS), and tunnel transport layer security (TTLS). Orig-
inally EAP was an 802.1X standard that allowed developers to pass security au-
thentication data between the authentication server, authenticator and supplicant.
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It was originally designed for dial-up point-to-point (PPP) connections, but is used
with upper layer protocols such as protocol for carrying authentication for network
access (PANA) and TTLS to work on wireless and wireless mesh networksr. EAP
802.1X resides in the access point or router and keeps the network port discon-
nected until authentication is completed. Depending on the results of the EAP
message, either the port is made available to the user, or the user is denied access
to the network. In these protocols, four types of messages are exchanged between
the client and authenticator server. Figure 2.5 shows how EAP works over IEEE
802.1X in four main steps.
1. Request identity message from authenticator.
2. Reply message from the client.
3. Success message from authenticator when authentication was successful.
4. Failure message from authenticator when authentication was unsuccessful.
Figure 2.5: EAP over IEEE 802.1X with RADIUS
EAP has some benefits and some weaknesses. It is extensible and changeable
and it can be modifed by adding other protocols, but EAP always needs another
protocol to complete the authentication process. Each access point or router that
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uses EAP also needs to support IEEE 802.1X, because it is the requirement of EAP.
EAP has a more complex authentication mechanism than other protocols (Blunk
et al., 2004, RFC 3748). EAP has three main entities (Frank, 2006):
Supplicant: is usually a client who is trying to access the network.
Authenticator: is usually an AP or router, which forwards the authentication
key / username and password or certificate to authentication server.
Authentication server: is normally a RADIUS / free radius server, which ana-
lyzes the received authenticator data.
IEEE 802.1X is an authentication method which was formed in the early
1990s. It is a port based authentication which carries the EAP message between
supplicant, authenticator, and authentication server. It was originally designed for
point-to-point networks. IEEE 802.1X is not suitable for authentication in a multi-
hop wireless mesh network because it is a port-based OSI Layer 2 authentication
protocol, and multi-hop networks need an OSI Layer 3 security protocol. It is not
a mutual authentication method, but if we use it with WPA and EAP it can do
mutual authentication as well (Khan and Akbar, 2006).
EAP is flexible with numerous authentication protocols, and new authen-
tication protocol can be added to it. It can limit the possible attacks and it is
independent of the network layer protocol like Internet protocol (IP) addresses,
because it is a link layer protocol. It can support retransmission and if the com-
munication is problematic, retransmission is possible and it can associate again. It
can dynamically send keys to clients. Refreshing WEP/WPA keys at short inter-
vals provides a good defense against many of the attacks. EAP-IEEE 802.1X can
be used with several other authentication protocols such as RADIUS, TLS, TTLS,
PANA and CHAP (Zhang et al., 2009).
2.1.10 EAP-RADIUS: Remote authentication dial in user service
Remote authentication dial in user service is also called RADIUS; it was designed
to solve the authentication problem in a network environment. It was originally
designed to be used in a wired network, but it is also being used on wireless
networks. The big difference between wired and wireless networks is that the
communication is processed at different layers of the OSI protocol stack.
 
 
 
 
25
There are two main authentication points:
1. Network authentication server (NAS)/(Router / AP).
2. Authentication server (AS)/(RADIUS server). RADIUS is mostly used with
802.1X, EAP-TLS, EAP-MD5, PAP and CHAP.
Figure 2.6: The full cycle of the RADIUS authentication process
As shown in Figure 2.6, there are four types of general message transferred by
EAP:
1. The client sends an EAP start packet to the authenticator.
2. The authenticator replies with an EAP identity request.
3. The supplicant sends an EAP identity response to the authenticator. Then
the authenticator transfers the received identity response to the authenti-
cation server. After receiving this packet the communication between the
supplicant and authentication server starts.
4. The authentication server analyzes the identity packet and then, if the au-
thentication was successful, the authentication server sends the RADIUS
access accept message, otherwise it sends a RADIUS access reject message
to the authenticator.
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When the supplicant gets the RADIUS access accept message from the au-
thentication server, the 802.1X port unblocks, and when the supplicant wants
to end the session it will send an extensible authentication protocol over LANs
(EAPOL) log off message to the authentication server, resulting in the blocking
of the 802.1X port (Husseiki, 2006). The RADIUS protocol uses UDP for packet
transfer through port number 1812. UDP is preferable because it is much faster
than transmission control protocol (TCP) (Rigney et al., 2000, RFC 2865). The
RADIUS server can also provide connectivity with smartcards. EAP messages are
exchanged between clients and the authenticator server using a smartcard. In this
method, a modem port or a universal serial bus (USB) port can be used for in-
stalling the smart card, but a USB port is better because many network devices
have a USB port. Smartcards support IP addresses and are installed on a RA-
DIUS server so that the authentication process can be controlled by the RADIUS
server (Urien and Badra, 2006).
Das et al. (2004a) proposed a dynamic authentication system using smart-
cards. The advantage of this system is that the users can change the password
freely. Nevertheless, it also has some drawbacks in that it cannot prevent guessing
attacks completely, it cannot authenticate mutually and the password can be found
by remote systems (Liao et al., 2006).
2.1.11 EAP-TLS: EAP-transport layer security
Extensible authentication protocol-transport layer security, defined in (Aboba and
Simon, 1999, RFC 2716). EAP-TLS is a mutual authentication protocol which was
developed by Microsoft in 1999 and is based on public key certificate authentica-
tionr. EAP-TLS supports link layer fragmentation and reconnects rapidly. TLS
uses an X.509 client/server certificate. This certificate is based on public key in-
frastructure (PKI), and it works on any hardware or software, such as Microsoft
operating systems, Apple and Linux.
EAP-TLS was the first authentication method to meet three goals for wireless
networks according to (Gast, 2005). Certificates provide strong authentication of
both the users to the network, and the network to users. Mutual authentication
provides a strong guard against rogue access points by enabling clients to determine
that an AP has been configured by the right department, rather than an attacker
who is intent only on stealing passwords. TLS also establishes a master secret key
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that can be used to derive keys for link layer security protocols (Gast, 2005).
However, EAP-TLS has some disadvantages; it is a point-to-point proto-
col that does only single-hop authentication (Aboba and Simon, 1999, RFC 2716).
Another main drawback of using EAP-TLS is the overhead caused by the authenti-
cation procedurer. The encryption and decryption are time consuming, but using a
certificate authority is a sound method for EAP-TLS authentication (Frank, 2006).
Figure 2.7: The EAP-TLS cycle
Figure 2.7 illustrates the EAP-TLS process. The EAP-TLS authentication
process exchanges and analyzes packets in several steps (Frank, 2006):
1. The supplicant sends the client “hello” to the authentication server to initiate
the session and exchange the identity request and reply.
2. The server replies to the request with a server “hello” message, which consists
of a server certificate.
3. This certificate is checked by the supplicant. If the server-side authentica-
tion was successful, the supplicant sends the client certificate which is then
checked similarly. Mutual authentication is accomplished if this last step is
successful.
2.1.12 EAP-TTLS: EAP-tunnel transport layer security
The EAP-TTLS protocol was developed by (Funk and Blake-Wilson, 2002). It has
an optional mutual authentication protocol, but commonly only one-sided authen-
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tication is used because mutual authentication can remove the sequence number
of EAP-TTLS messages and can be the cause of overloading (Frank, 2006). It
uses two authenticated layers that are external and internal. The external authen-
tication uses a TLS handshake protocol for security, and internal authentication
is for isolating users via EAP or password authentication protocols such as PAP
or CHAP. EAP-TTLS is very flexible and it can be used together with other au-
thentication protocols. EAP-TTLS is enabled by a third party server (Funk and
Blake-Wilson, 2002). Figure 2.8 shows a typical network configuration using EAP-
TTLS. Table 2.1 lists the acronyms used in EAP-TTLS authentication and not
defined in the glossary.
Figure 2.8: The EAP-TTLS cycle
 
 
 
 
29
Table 2.1: EAP-TTLS acronymns
Acronym Meaning
RAR Radius access request
RAC Radius access challenge
CH Client hello
SKE Server key exchange
SH Server hello
CKE Client key exchange
CCS Common channel signaling
CHAP-CP CHAP-challenge and password
DCS Data-cipher suite
UN User name
CHAP-C CHAP-client
CHAP-P CHAP-password
RAA Radius access accept
DKM Data keying material
2.1.13 EAP-MD5: EAP-Message design 5
MD5 stands for Message-Digest 5 developed by Ronald Rivest in 1991 (Rivest,
1992, RFC 1321). MD5 was designed to work with the EAP protocol and it is an
enhanced type of MD4. EAP-MD5 is specified in RFC 1994 (Simpson, 1996). and
it was widely used in the 802.1X wired Ethernet switch but now it also used in
wireless networks. EAP-MD5 is useful for public applications in which encryption
is used at the application level. It uses a hash value for authentication. It has
some security drawbacks, e.g. MD5 does not have any security key in the case of
wireless networks. It cannot support mutual authentication, and conflicts of hash
values can be another problem of this protocol. EAP-MD5 collects a username and
a password from the user to be authenticated, encrypts that via the MD5 message
hashing algorithm, and passes that data on to a RADIUS server (Blunk et al.,
2004, RFC 3748).
2.1.14 LEAP: lightweight extensible authentication protocol
Cisco provides an apropiate wireless LAN security protocol called lightweight ex-
tensible authentication protocol (LEAP). It works with an authentication server
like a RADIUS server. It is a password-based authentication that also can use a
shared key mechanism. LEAP uses mutual authentication and can provide dy-
namic encryption keys. LEAP was a big step forward from the system of WEP
manual keys to a dynamic encryption key system, but it uses MS-CHAP that is
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prone to dictionary-based attacks and it is proprietary to Cisco and can be used
only with Cisco devices (Virendra et al., 2005) and (Gast, 2005).
2.2 Wi-Fi mesh network authentication
A wireless mesh network consists of mesh nodes and mesh clients, without any
specific infrastructure. Mesh networks are a type of ad-hoc network which we in-
troduced in Section 1.1. Mesh networks have a multi-hop architecture. User access
control on multi-hop networks is more difficult than on single-hop wireless net-
works. Therefore user access management in wireless mesh networks is a challenge
for the network administrator. Wireless mesh networks must therefore consider
additional configurations for the authentication.
Access control in ad-hoc networks is a persistent challenge for several reasons.
First, it is unlike wired networks or wireless cellular networks where access control
can be deployed at a router or base station. Ad-hoc networks have a loosely
structured architecture under continual change. Second, the access control of mesh
networks has distribution problems. If all authentication is performed by a central
device then it will tend to have bandwidth and overhead problems. Third, ad-hoc
nodes moving from place to place need to have access to the network all the time
and everywhere (Lee et al., 2008). Approaches include centralized authentication
and distributed authentication. The centralized authentication mechanisms are
detailed in Section 2.2.1 and distributed authentication mechanisms are described
in Section 2.2.2.
2.2.1 Centralized authentication
Centralized authentication is a server and client mechanism where only the central
device can issue certificates for the clients. If the central device is not available there
is no way to renew or revoke other members. Because of this central authentication
has a single point of failure, and is also not very scalable in wireless mesh networks.
A certificate authority (CA) is an entity which issues digital certificates such
as public and private key pairs. The CA uses third party software for digital sig-
nature certification. In this method openssl mostly works as third party software.
openssl is software that provides secure access to other networks as well. It en-
crypts the key which passes between the client and the server. The client and
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server share a secure ticket otherwise they cannot associate with each other. So
the server needs to authenticate the key or ticket of the client trying gain access
to the network with this pre-assigned key.
IEEE 802.1X and X.509 certificates
The IEEE 802.1X/EAP scheme uses a centralized server playing the role of an
authenticator. However, considering the architecture of a wireless mesh, which is
based on ad-hoc links between nodes, the need for multi-hop authentication has
not been addressed. Some nodes have no single-hop access to the server. Since
the mobility of the nodes within the WMN requires regular establishment of links
with new neighbors, there is a definite need to provide multi-hop (re)authentication
mechanisms in order to allow nodes to authenticate with the central server through
a path of multiple authenticated nodes. Furthermore, the multi-hop authentication
process between a client and the server, which is usually a combination of an EAP
method and an AAA carrier protocol, should not reveal crucial information, e.g.
the PSK, to the other MPs on the multi-hop path. This imposes some alterations,
adaptations and restrictions on the EAP method and the AAA protocol (Cheikh-
rouhou et al., 2006).
Tung et al. researched CA using 802.1X and X.509 (Tung et al., 2006). They
set up a CA server under RADIUS where the user can apply for an X.509 public
key certificate through a webpage interface that is installed in RADIUS. RADIUS
receives the application for the certificate and passes it to a CA manager. If
the CA Manager approves the certificate application, it produces the user public
key certificate and passes it back to the RADIUS database for users. After the
user completes the certificate application, the certificate can be looked up in the
RADIUS database and then obtain its own public key certificate and the public
key certificate of the CA. In the case of more than one CA server, users obtain
all CA certificates, after these CA servers mutually authenticate each other (Tung
et al., 2006).
Authentication in a layered security approach
Komninos et al. (2007) explored integrated cryptographic mechanisms in the first
and second phases to design multiple lines of authentication defense and further
protect ad-hoc networks against malicious attacks. Based on the project of Komni-
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nos et al., symmetric key, asymmetric key, and elliptic curve cryptosystems were
implemented to offer a complete analysis of the authentication protocols. AES and
MD5 were implemented as symmetric key algorithms, and the Rivest Shamir Adel-
man (RSA), and Menezes Vanstone cryptosystems were used as asymmetric key
algorithms. The key size was based on the X9.30 standard specifications (Komni-
nos et al., 2007). However, this strong encryption mechanism can reduce the
performance of networks, especially in a large wireless mesh network, but dynamic
authentication and encryption is much better than static authentication.
EAP-PANA: Protocol for carrying authentication for network access
EAP-Protocol for carrying authentication for network access (EAP-PANA) has
been under development by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) since
2001 (Forsberg et al., 2008, RFC 5191). It is a type of authentication that assists
clients to access the network. It works on multi-hop WMNs. PANA uses a similar
authentication scheme as 802.1X, which works on the IP layer for multi-access and
point-to-point links. PANA carries the authentication between the client and the
server. PANA messaging involves several processes. Figure 2.9 shows the PANA
framework authentication process. When clients are connected to the network they
can get their IP address named the “pre-PANA address” through a DHCP server
and can then get accredited by a PANA server called a PANA authentication
agent (PAA). The PAA forwards request messages to the authentication server
(AS) using an enforcement point (EP) for verification. The AS has a database of
authorized and unauthorized clients, which checks the accreditation of clients in
the database and if the accreditation is correct, the client can access the network
or else will be denied (Khan and Akbar, 2006).
PANA is a framework that passes authentication messages around the net-
work. The sequence of messages exchanged during a successful authentication
process has several parts. The mesh access router sends an EAP-request/identity
message encapsulated in the PANA-authorization-request message to the PANA
client (PaC). This message initiates the process of authentication and then the
authentication proceeds as follows:
1. Upon receiving the EAP-request/identity message, the PaC returns an iden-
tity, e.g. username, hostname, etc., in an EAP-response/identity message
encapsulated into a PANA-authorization-answer message.
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Figure 2.9: The EAP-PANA-TLS cycle
2. Once having received the PaC’s identity, the mesh router forwards this mes-
sage to the AS. From this point, the mesh router acts as a pass-through
between the PaC and the AS.
3. The AS then sends an EAP-TLS/start packet to start the EAP-TLS conver-
sation with the PaC.
4. The PaC responds by sending a TLS client “hello” handshake message which
contains the TLS version number, a TLS session ID, a random number, and
a set of supported cipher encryption algorithms.
5. The AS then sends an EAP-Request packet containing a TLS server “hello”
handshake message followed by a TLS certificate, server key exchange, and
certificate request and server “hello done”. The server “hello” handshake
message contains the AS’s TLS version number, another random number, a
session ID, and the selected cipher encryption algorithms.
6. The PaC sends an EAP-response packet containing a client certificate, a client
key exchange (which determines the session key—Master Session Key—with
the server key exchange) and, verify certificate, which is a digital signature
of the authentication response.
7. Upon receiving this EAP-Response packet, the AS proceeds by verifying the
PaC’s certificate and the digital signature. If the test succeeds, it sends
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an EAP-Request packet containing the TLS change cipher specification and
finished handshake messages which include a keyed hash over the message.
By verifying the keyed hash, the PaC can authenticate the AS (EAP server).
If the authentication is successful, the PaC and AS exchange EAP-response
and EAP-success messages.
EAP-TTLS over PANA was proposed by Khan and Akbar. EAP-TTLS
is an extension of TLS and it can be used with PAP, CHAP and MD5. Au-
thentication protocols are mostly applied in the link layer and the network layer.
Therefore, the operations of either the link or the network layer can enable one
of the two phases to take place. In phase one, for example, the node authenti-
cation procedure attempts to determine the true identity of the communicating
nodes through challenge-response protocols based on symmetric key techniques.
Likewise, in phase two the authentication procedure again seeks the identities of
the communicating nodes through challenge-response protocols based on public key
techniques. In the first phase, the node identification procedure assumes that the
secret is known to the verifying node, and this secret is used to verify the response
with symmetric techniques. In the second phase of the authentication, the secret is
not actually known to the verifying node. Asymmetric techniques can be applied
before private information is exchanged between communicating nodes (Khan and
Akbar, 2006).
OpenVPN
OpenVPN is a free, open source VPN built on SSL encryption. OpenVPN can sup-
port a wide range of operating systems such as Linux, Windows 2000/XP and later,
OpenBSD, FreeBSD, NetBSD, Mac OS X, and Solaris. OpenVPN encapsulates all
traffic in an encrypted tunnel, OpenVPN has higher latency than distributed au-
thentication or other authentication mechanisms. OpenVPN can use public and
private keys and also shared secret keys. The following benefits of OpenVPN that
are of interest to us have led us to test it in our research:
1. It uses SSL and RSA which are strong encryption systems.
2. Configuration is easy.
3. A wide range of hardware and software support OpenVPN .
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4. Freifunk has a well documented open source version of OpenVPN .
5. It is completely free and has changeable source code making it amenable to
localization.
6. We can use OpenVPN in TCP or assign it to a UDP port and it works on
the network and data-link layer.
OpenVPN is a client-server based mechanism that has a single point of fail-
ure, more load in a single point, and if we apply it to wireless mesh networks we
have to generate key pairs for each client. Therefore it is not suitable for wireless
mesh network authentication, especially in the backbone. The interface for creat-
ing OpenVPN certificates and keys is shown in Chapter 3, Figures 3.11 and 3.12.
OpenVPN operates in the link layer and the network layer of the OSI model. It uses
TLS for authentication and it can transport datagrams and OSI Layer 2 frames.
OpenVPN is a most secure VPN as it uses SSL/TLS. It uses a sequence number
and encrypts the datagram of the frame in the channel (Snader, 2007).
2.2.2 Distributed authentication
Distributed authentication is necessary in a wireless mesh network mechanism in
which each mesh node can function like a central device, but using a shared key
remains a risk, because a shared key can have problems which we already pointed
out in Section 2.1.5. Mesh networks can grow and fragment. Therefore centralized
authentication can cause extra load and overhead to a central authentication server.
Distributed authentication and key management
Husseiki’s (2006) thesis proposed a certificate authority system as a general ap-
proach for distribution authentication of WMNs. His thesis proposed an hierarchi-
cal schema for wireless mesh networks to have an authentication server, supervisor
and members of the WMN, that seems a very useful approach, for wireless mesh
network fragmentation, but unfortunately it is not applicable on wireless mesh
networks.
The changeability of structure of a WMN requires the possibility of obtaining
certificates that are valid in multiple fragmented sections of the network. Therefore,
certificates that are issued locally between mesh points in the WMN should also
be valid when the a device holding such a certificate moves to the neighbor of
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another mesh points broadcasting the SSID of the same wireless mesh network.
Even if it works, the hierarchical CA mechanisms do not solve the problem of
single point of failure. Any compromised CA can cause the failure of the entire
security system (Husseiki, 2006).
Wireless distributed system
The distributed authentication algorithm allows small enterprises to use a shared-
secret-key mechanism and it allows a multi-hop environment to grow beyond a
single AP in a wireless distributed system (WDS). This method simplifies the in-
stallation and deployment of the WDS. If an organization were to use the existing
independent basic services set (IBSS) authentication for the wireless mesh network,
then the administrator would have to provide a key for every mesh point—which
is not easy. In a dynamic organization, this management burden would be in-
tolerable. The only solution, currently, is to install an AAA server and perform
centralized authentication. Yet, this management burden may be too heavy for
the central server.
Distributed authentication scheme for wireless LAN based
Lee et al. proposed a distributed authentication mechanism for wireles network
with a secure shared key which can significantly reduce the load and overhead of
a central authentication server and speed up the mesh network (Lee et al., 2008).
Lee et al. proposed a network where the administrator only needs to establish one
PSK between two mesh points within the WMN and the clients from each WDS
can roam freely between the two systems. This is a distributed authentication
mechanism where a small enterprise network purchases a single AP to support
one or more stations and each access point can work as an authentication server.
This works without the need for an AAA server, but it cannot grow easily beyond
the single AP scenario without tedious manual key management. This algorithm is
designed to allow the enterprise to add APs easily and still provide the same degree
of security as the single AP case without any additional work for the administrator.
The algorithm used in this distributed authentication system supports two
isolated WDSs joined to form a single WMN. The system administrator need only
establish a single shared secret between the two connecting APs, then clients from
each WDS will be able to roam freely between the two systems. This method is a
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combination of a modified Otway-Reese protocol with broadcasting for a novel dis-
tributed authentication algorithm within dynamic topologies that easily integrates
into EAP and the IEEE 802.11i protocols. This protocol uses a reactive rout-
ing protocol which is a mandatory routing protocol of the IEEE 802.11s standard
which defines WLAN-based mesh networks. Lee et al. used the NS-2 simulator for
testing their approach. They used AODV as a routing protocol. They also tested
the delay and found a lower authentication delay compared to the existing scheme
with a centralized architecture. Generally, the objective of increasing the number
of nodes with the authentication functionality is to distribute the load over the
nodes, therefore, to enhance the performance of the authentication operation and
the performance of the network accordingly.
Lee et al. have a very good approach for wireless mesh networks, but this
is only for wireless LAN and it does not work in the backbone of a wireless mesh
network since they used IEEE 802.11i standards that are limited to OSI Layer 2,
and the security weakness pointed out in Section 2.1.7.
URSA: ubiquitous and robust access control for mobile ad hoc networks
Luo et al. in 2004 proposed ubiquitous and robust access control for mobile ad hoc
networks (URSA), that is a localized and ubiquitous authentication mechanism.
URSA which is a user access mechanism based on the network layer, is fully local-
ized to provide ubiquitous and robust access control for mobile ad-hoc networks.
The proposed solution takes a ticket-based approach. Each well-behaving node
uses a certified ticket to participate in routing and packet forwarding. Nodes with-
out a ticket cannot access the network and will be denied. If a node moves from
one mesh point’s coverage to another coverage it needs to be certified by the new
cover or parent. The tickets issued by a mesh point are valid for a fixed period after
which they expire. The expiring ticket of a well-behaving node will be renewed
collectively by its local monitoring neighbors, while a misbehaving node will be
denied ticket renewal or its ticket will be revoked.
A mobile ad-hoc network which is protected by URSA cannot issue tickets
to new users. First time users need to purchase a ticket from the central authen-
tication office. After the ticket is granted, the mobile ad-hoc network can renew
that ticket, before it expires.
URSA implements ticket certification services through multiple-node consen-
 
 
 
 
38
sus and fully localized instantiation. It uses tickets to identify and grant network
access to well-behaving nodes. In URSA, no single node monopolizes the access
decision or is completely trusted. Instead, multiple nodes jointly monitor a local
node and certify/revoke its ticket. Furthermore, URSA ticket certification services
are fully localized into each node’s neighborhood to ensure service ubiquity and
resilience. The NS-2 simulator was used in the Luo et al. (2004) project. URSA
is an efficient mechanism for authentication between two router-router networks.
URSA seems a promising mechanism for Wi-Fi mesh networks, but still the
networks are related to a central server.
AGE: Authentication on the edge
Authentication on the edge (AGE) is a localized method for Wi-Fi and global
open Wi-fi network access. AGE uses EAP-TLS as authentication. In the AGE
project (Thompson et al., 2007) proposed distributed authentication on the edge,
and implemented it in the Internet as a network between SPs. Thompson et al.
compared EAP-TLS with EAP-AGE and found the latter to be much better. In
EAP-AGE each node can operate without central server intervention. AGE uses
a certification mechanism in which each device that wants to access the network
should have a certificate. AGE localizes the authentication on each AP so that once
a client gets a certificate then the client certificate does not need to be authenticated
in the central server. The local AP can authenticate the client CA.
This authentication mechanism requires little user interaction since it does
not work like a user-name-and-password mechanism. It is an automatic mecha-
nism. The central server gives a certificate an expiration time and the client just
needs to update the certificate. AGE is a localized and distributed authentication
method proposed by (Thompson et al., 2007) for the global-scale Internet access in-
frastructure (GIANT) network to avoid Internet authentication. Three main ideas
are used to address edge authentication
1. The use of certificate-based authentication,
2. the distribution of certificate revocation list segments to all entities, and
3. the self organization of access points into a social look-up network.
Authentication on the edge combines centralized administration and oper-
ator assistance with distributed algorithms to confine the authentication to the
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edge of the network. These methods achieve the scalability needed for the over-
whelming size and volume of a global network and increase resiliency against in-
trusion. (Thompson et al., 2007). This method, like URSA, works based on CA,
but it uses TLS and certificate revocation lists (CRLs) instead of private keys.
A trusted third party is responsible for managing user credentials and handling
billing. Table 2.2 lists the acronyms used in EAP-AGE authentication and not
defined in the glossary. AGE localizes and completely decentralizes the authenti-
cation process itself while relying on a central server to manage, maintain, admin-
ister and disseminate updates of authentication material as a task separate from
authentication itself. It is a mechanism that lies between fully centralized and fully
distributed.
AGE’s mechanisms make it well suited to GIANT networks. AGE supports a
single authentication authority allowing clients to access the service anywhere with
the same user ID and authentication credentials. Authentication in AGE proceeds
with as little user interaction as possible—the user only has to select the GIANT
SSID for association—and AGE is resilient to the variable network conditions in
GIANT including potential loss of connectivity to the central server.
AGE is similar to EAP-TLS authentication. As we have mentioned in Sec-
tion 2.1.11 EAP-TLS is a certificate-based method which uses public and private
keys for certification. A central server operates the AGE CA which manages the
certificates for all GIANT users. The central server pushes updates to all relevant
parties when authentication material changes. To continue operation in the face of
server failure and avoid delays caused by accessing an authentication server in the
Internet, each AGE AP runs a self contained authenticator, confirming the authen-
Table 2.2: EAP/AGE acronymns
Acronym Meaning
Assoc Associate
Req Request
OW Open Wi-Fi
Auth Authentication
CRL Certificate revocation list
AGE Authentication on the edge
AA Access accept
AR Access request
AC Access challenge
 
 
 
 
40
Figure 2.10: AGE authentication process
tication process to the wireless link. Only the CA root certificate is embedded at
every entity allowing clients and access points to verify each other’s certificates lo-
cally. AGE uses CRLs to inform AGE entities when a certificate has been revoked
before its expiration. The CRL is also maintained by the AGE central server.
AGE was implemented as a new EAP module for the FreeRADIUS server
and wpa supplicant Linux software packages. It is also uploaded to the OpenWrt
open source router firmware for the LinksysWRT home wireless router.
Measurement results comparing EAP-AGE to EAP-TLS in the GIANT sce-
nario show that AGE satisfies requests with between 49.7% and 71.6% lower delay,
around 490 msec and 1614 msec, providing a faster and more predictable authen-
tication (Thompson et al., 2007).
Thompson et al.’s project is a useful project that localized the authentication
and uses a local authentication server instead of an Internet authentication server,
but can also use a central server.
TincVPN
TincVPN is a virtual private network (VPN) daemon that uses tunneling and
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encryption to create a secure private network (Tinc, 1998). TincVPN supports
an encrypted tunnel between two hosts, and it can have the VPN between edges,
too. Tinc does auto routing and manages the routing itself. Packet exchange in
TincVPN is similar to the open shortest path first (OSPF) routing protocol. This
information is continually updated as nodes join or leave the network or become
unreachable. Tinc uses two channels for each VPN, i.e. UDP and TCP. Tinc
operates at both the Link layer and IP layer. Conceptually in Tinc each node
behaves as a VPN gateway. In addition, Tinc features encryption, authentication
and compression where traffic is optionally compressed using zlib or LZO and the
openssl library but it does not use the SSL protocol itself. Tinc protects the
message from tampering and alterations with message authentication codes and
sequence numbers (Snader, 2007, Pages 1–7).
TincVPN supports automatic full mesh routing. Regardless of how Tinc
daemons have been connected to each other, since it supports multi-hop authen-
tication, VPN traffic goes directly to the destination without going through inter-
mediate hops.
We can easily expand a VPN through Tinc to several wireless mesh networks.
In order to add nodes to the VPN, all we have to do is add an extra configuration
file. There is no need to start new daemons or create and configure new devices or
network interfaces. It automatically creates a virtual interface and we can apply
the security to that virtual interface. TincVPN has the ability to bridge ethernet
segments. We can link multiple ethernet segments together to function like one
segment so it is very useful for segmentation and fragmentation of wireless mesh
networks.
TincVPN supports many operating systems, and also supports IPv6. Cur-
rently Linux, FreeBSD, OpenBSD, NetBSD, MacOS/X, Solaris, Windows 2000,
XP, Vista and Windows 7 platforms are supported. Tinc also has full support for
IPv6, providing both the possibility of tunneling IPv6 traffic over its tunnels and
of creating tunnels over existing IPv6 networks.
Although Tinc uses the openssl library, it does not use the SSL protocol
to establish connections between daemons. The reason for is that when Tinc was
created, SSL was starting to gain popularity for use outside web browsers and
servers. SSL at that time did not make it easy to have both sides of the connection
to authenticate each other. SSL requires a TCP-like transport layer to function,
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whereas a VPN works much more efficientily if it can send encapsulated packets
via a UDP-like transport layer(Tinc, 1998).
When Tinc encrypts UDP packets, it uses the cipher block chaining (CBC)
block cipher mode with a 32-bit counter. This was chosen to avoid the overhead
of a full random IV for every packet. However, due to the predictable IV, an
attacker could launch a chosen-plaintext attack (Katz and Lindell, 2007). Tinc
distinguishers known plaintexts from each other. The main problem of TincVPN
is the restricted memory of devices. TincVPN has a large overhead on the router
for authentication and every router has to function as both server and client.
By default, Tinc uses hashed message authentication code (HMAC) to au-
thenticate packets that are trunctated to 32 bits. This default was chosed to avoid
the overhead of a full 160-bit hash for every packet. An attacker on a high-speed
network connection could inject a forged packet by sending it 231 times on average
with different HMACs. It is possible to change the strength of the HMAC with
the MAC length option. The default length will change in the future.
Tinc uses RSA without padding. Padding schemes are designed to prevent
attacks when the size of the plaintext is not equal to the size of the RSA key.
However, Tinc always encrypts random numbers that have the same size as the
RSA key. This should be safe. There are timing attacks against RSA—Tinc does
not protect against those. Tinc uses RSA encryption to send symmetric cipher
keys to its peer. Then, a challenge/response exchange is done to verify that each
peer indeed has the private key. However, MiTM attack is possible where an
attacker that has the public key of one of the peers gains control over one side
of the communication between two peers. The MiTM cannot decrypt messages
between peers, but it can send messages to the peer that initiated the connection.
If the MiTM knows enough about the VPN, it could trick peers into sending it
packets that it can decrypt. However, the MiTM cannot send packets to other
peers (Snader, 2007).
2.3 Summary
This chapter covered the IEEE 802.11 authentication protocols that are used in Wi-
Fi infrastructure networks and Wi-Fi mesh networks. Section 2.1 covered 14 types
of authentication protocols that are used in Wi-Fi infrastructure networks, they are
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support single-hop Wi-Fi networks. However, the security of Wi-Fi mesh networkis
is difficult and problematic for several reasons. Wi-Fi mesh networks have unstable
architecture and are under continual change. Access control of mesh networks has
distribution problems and central devices have a performance overhead. Wi-Fi
mesh points move around from place to place and need to have access to the
network all the time and everywhere (Lee et al., 2008).
Section 2.2 covered the Wi-Fi mesh network authentication that includes
central authentication mechanisms such as IEEE-802.1X (Cheikhrouhou et al.,
2006), PANA (Khan and Akbar, 2006) and OpenVPN (Snader, 2007). It also
covered distributed authenticator URSA (Luo et al., 2004), EAP-AGE (Thompson
et al., 2007), distributed authentication and key management with TincVPN .
Chapter 3 discusses the methodology and Experimental network.
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3
Methodology
This chapter first discusses the challenges of existing Wi-Fi mesh networks in Sec-
tion 3.1. The research questions are defined in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 deals with
the overall approach and implementation of the research. We cover the experi-
mental design for analyzing authentication mechanisms of Wi-fi and Wi-Fi mesh
networks. Section 3.4 covers the experimental design. Section 3.5 discusses the
choices for mesh firmware and Section 3.6 describes protocol modification. Finally,
Section 3.7 summarizes the contents of this chapter. The results are presented in
Chapter 4.
3.1 Challenges for Wi-Fi mesh network authentication
Single-hop wireless networks are difficult to extend but are more secure and more
easily controled than wireless mesh networks. Mesh networks are more easily ex-
tended and are more scalable than wired and single-hop wireless networks, but
they are more vulnerable to different types of attack. Less security is one of the
important drawbacks of wireless mesh networks. Several mechanisms are defined
for the security of wireless mesh networks such as various type of authentication,
encryption and filtering systems. However, each of the current methods entails
some limitations with respect to fragmentation and dynamicaly distributed au-
thentication. Several user access management methods were discussed in Chapters
1 and 2. We compare and summarize these protocols in Chapter 4. The access
policies of most wireless mesh networks are vulnerable to attack and most of them
only work on single-hop wireless networks.
Extension of a mesh network can complicate security administration and
reduce the performance of the network, because of added computation required
for authentication services causing device latencies. Most of the authentication
methods were designed for a single-hop wireless environment such as IEEE 802.1X,
45
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but mesh networks are multi-hop networks, requiring protocols that can support
multi-hop networks and multi-hop network authentication. Encryption of protocols
such as WEP encryption is done only on the authenticator side and passwords from
the client’s side are in clear text, which an attacker can capture and use to gain
access to the network. Some of the other protocols such as EAP-TLS or EAP-TTLS
have mutual authentication. The encryption and decryption of the packets causes
overhead and reduces the performance of the network. These protocols only work
on the OSI link layer. Thus, most of the protocols such as medium access control
(MAC) filtering or IEEE 802.1X, PAP and CHAP work on the link layer, and they
are vulnerable to different attacks and cannot support a backbone wireless mesh
network.
A protocol such as EAP-RADIUS was originaly designed for wired networks
but is currently also used in wireless networks. RADIUS is based on IP addresses
but the security of this method is guaranteed over a one-hop wireless connection
with a central RADIUS server. Multi-hop wireless mesh networks are still vulner-
able to unauthorized access (Frank, 2006; Aboba and Calhoun, 2003, RFC 3579).
RADIUS also works on the link layer and cannot support a backbone wireless mesh
network.
WMNs can be compromised more easily than wired networks due to sev-
eral factors: (1) their distributed network architecture, (2) the vulnerability of
channels and nodes in the shared wireless medium, and (3) dynamic changes of
network topology. Attacks on routing protocols and MAC protocols is possible
on WMNs. Wireless links are vulnerable to attacks that other wireless media are
also prone to, so suitable cryptographic protection has to be setup for WMNs.
A dynamic and distributed authentication method to support multi-hop or mesh
wireless networks, which can circumvent single failures and reduce the load of the
central authentication server, is required.
A centralized authentication scheme is not suitable for WMNs where the
network topologies are dynamic and distributed, due to mobility and network fail-
ure that arises from their ad-hoc nature. Moreover, key management in WMNs
is much more difficult than in infrastructure wireless networks, because it’s more
complicated for a central authority to handle distributed networks. The dynamic
characteristic of WMNs also makes key management more complicated. Key man-
agement in WMNs needs to be performed in a distributed but secure manner.
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Therefore, a distributed authentication and authorization scheme with secure key
management is needed for WMNs. Distributed authentication with a public key
infrastructure is straightforward for the implementers. It is, however, a major
management and operational hurdle for end users (Frank, 2006).
The IEEE 802.11i standard defines the security architectures for protecting
the link layer between the client and the AP. It provides the security architecture
such as authentication, confidentiality, key management, data origin authenticity
and replay protection. The authentication framework of this standard is for both
infrastructure and ad-hoc modes. This authentication framework uses a combi-
nation of several protocols such as IEEE 802.1X and TLS. Authentication is per-
formed through the interaction of three entities—client, AP, and authentication
server. Authentication is performed to give access to the network only for legit-
imate nodes. For infrastructure WLANs, this is performed through a centralized
server such as RADIUS.
WPA, which was developed by the 802.11i group, is able to encrypt the data
transferred between mesh nodes, it also provides authentication simultaneously.
WPA works together with a network authentication server (NAS), and other pro-
tocols such as EAP-802.1X, and RADIUS (Frank, 2006), but it does not function
on the backbone wireless mesh network which works on OSI Layer 3.
Based on our analysis of mesh network authentication, dynamic authentica-
tion and combinations of several existing authentication protocols in wireless mesh
networks are very important for preventing attacks and securing the network. A
hybrid wireless mesh network has two parts (1) a mobile ad-hoc network or clients
and (2) an infrastructure or backbone wireless mesh network (Akyildiz and Wang,
2005). Existing authentication protocols cannot secure the connections between
routers.
Wireless networks are vulnerable to various types of attack and the following
are the most common attacks on wireless mesh networks:
DoS is an attack where the attacker hampers the normal functioning of a server by
flooding it with repeated requests for services that it cannot cope with because of
the volume, making it virtually impossible for the server behave normally. Recently
the website “wikileaks.com” has been forced to distribute its website all over the
internet to many sites such as “wikileaks.za.org” to counter the DoS attacks.
On 11 January 2011 the latter site was functional but because of DoS attacks
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by persons unknown the wikileaks.com site advertized an apology for not being
available.
Unfortunately, this type of attack cannot be completely avoided as the at-
tacker can do this easily when the IP address of the router is known. DoS is normaly
maliciously accomplished in the link layer of wireless mesh networks where the at-
tacker sends loose packets to network devices that have to respond but take up
so much processing power on the device that delays and latencies are caused in
networks. Cryptographic systems can reduce the impact of such attacks.
Unauthorized access is another attack that often occurs in wireless mesh net-
works. This is known as the man-in-the-middle or MiTM attack. It usually occurs
when the security mechanism implemented does not provide mutual authentica-
tion. Other attacks known to occur include session hijacking, reflection attacks
and other attacks due to the abuse of cryptographic services. There are different
authentication mechanisms to avoid this attack, but each of these have some draw-
backs that the attacker can exploit. The password authentication mechanisms,
MAC address filtering, and IP address filtering are rather vulnerable to MiTM
attacks.
3.2 Research questions
The challenges for Wi-Fi mesh network authentication discussed in Section 3.1 lead
us toward answering the two questions that we gave in Section 1.3 namely,
1. How can we characterize and compare existing Wi-Fi authentication mecha-
nisms?
2. What are the best options for Wi-Fi mesh network authentication?
These questions lead us to study the characterization and features of existing au-
thentication protocols, and learn how they can be applied to authentication on
wireless mesh networks. Sections 3.3–3.6 and Tables 4.1–4.2 answer the first ques-
tion. Sections 4.1–4.2 and their tables address the second question.
3.3 Overall approach
The aim of this project is to identify authentication mechanisms that addresses
secure user access to the wireless mesh network, based on existing standards, mech-
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anisms, protocols and current solutions under consideration in the standardization
process of wireless mesh networks. Therefore, in this thesis, a gradual approach
was followed. A literature review was first conducted in order to gather general
information about wireless mesh networks, their specifications and characteristics,
along with their application trends. Established definitions, descriptions and anal-
ysis of wireless mesh networks characteristics were spotted on the internet, papers,
reviews, documents, standards and other materials focusing on security aspects in
wireless mesh networks were highlighted for an in-depth study.
After we studied many issues related to wireless mesh network authentication,
a wireless mesh network was designed and implemented physically for experimental
purposes. Five Linksys Wrt54gl routers were used for practical work. Several designs
of wireless mesh networks such as infrastructure wireless networks, mobile ad-hoc
wireless mesh networks, infrastructure wireless mesh networks1 and hybrid wireless
mesh networks were designed and built for the testing of several authentication
protocols.
Figure 3.1: Outline of project design
Figure 3.1 outlines the steps followed in our project design.
3.4 Experimental design
As the Linksys Wrt54gl router allows firmware changes, five types of Linksys firmware
were compared. Each of these has weaknesses and limitations, but also has ad-
vantages in respect of wireless mesh networks and available wireless mesh network
1Infrastructure wireless mesh networks are also known as backbone wireless mesh networks.
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packages. Unfortunately, all of them have the limitation of no authentication and
user access management on the wireless mesh network. We compared 14 types
of user access mechanisms on a single-hop wireless network and several designs of
wireless mesh network. In order to identify suitable solutions we tested various
packages using OpenWrt and Freifunk firmware. We selected Freifunk firmware for
our experimental network and applied BATMAN and OLSR to the wireless routers
as routing protocols. We compared the facilities and features as listed in Chapter 4.
In order to evaluate and characterize the 14 authentication mechanisms de-
scribed in Section 2.1 we designed a wireless mesh network in the main building
of Kabul University Computer Science Faculty which has two floors. Two routers
were installed on the first floor and three others on the second floor. On this phys-
ical mesh network we tested the connections and user access management. We
installed OLSR and used the visualization package of OLSR which can calculate
the route, show the metrics, show the accessibility of each point, and show the
quality of each link as well. Figure 3.2 shows the network topology, IP addresses,
name of routers and quality of links generated by the OLSR visualization packages.
3.4.1 Network Design
Our first wireless network design was not a mesh network. We found that the
Linksys Wrt54gl has changeable firmware but its default firmware does not support
mesh networks. However, the open source OpenWrt firmware is capable of sup-
porting mesh networks. This makes OpenWrt amenable to experimentation. We
went on to test the features of Freifunk, Meshcom OpenAP, and DD-WRT.
We tested authentication protocols and user access management protocols
in infrastructure wireless networks and several types of wireless mesh network.
Chapter 2 described each protocol theoretically. Section3.4.2 provides more prac-
tical detail of various designs of wireless mesh networks, using Linksys firmware.
3.4.2 Mesh network design
The study required us (1) to select the devices to use for wireless mesh networks,
(2) to understand the software and hardware requirements, and (3) to study the
design of wireless mesh networks. In our research, we used Wrt54gl wireless routers
because of the ease of altering the firmware for the purposes of comparison and be-
cause we are familiar with configuring Linux-based firmware used on these routers.
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Five types of firmware were used for comparing and testing mesh network au-
thentication capabilities. After designing and setting up a real mesh network, we
Figure 3.2: Visualization of mesh network with OLSR
tested and compared the firmware and protocols. The steps below were followed
in designing a wireless mesh network:
1. Upload firmware which supports wireless mesh networks, such as OpenWrt,
Meshcom OpenAP, DD-WRT, or OpenWrt-g-Freifunk.
2. Upload the recommended and necessary packages to support the mesh net-
work.
3. Plan the IP addresses.
4. Design the network and the location of routers.
5. Every router needs the same SSID or ESSID, same basic service set identifier
(BSSID), same channel, and the same setting to be wireless mesh points.
We can use the web interface of the firmware, but we can do only a limited
amount of configuration of the networks and protocols from the web interface. We
have to use ssh or telnet to do the configuration, and use a cross compiler to
compile missing firmware packages.
There are three types of wireless mesh network: (1) Mobile ad-hoc networks
in which mobile clients are connected to each other without using any router. (2)
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In infrastructure wireless mesh networks the routers are connected to each other
without being connected to the clients. In this type of wireless mesh network,
routers are connected in ad-hoc mode and to an AP directly by cable and are
connected to the router mesh points for access of clients in the network. (3) There
are hybrid wireless mesh networks in which all the routers and mobile clients are
connected to one another (Akyildiz and Wang, 2005). Figure 3.3 illustrates the
Figure 3.3: Design of a hybrid wireless mesh network
design of a hybrid wireless network.
User access management has specific software and hardware requirements
to be able to access wireless networks. If the devices do not have the necessary
software and hardware then access will be denied to devices The connections be-
tween wireless routers and clients are also based on a specific policy. Figure 3.4
shows required modes for wireless routers to be able to associate and communi-
cate with each other. Table 3.1 shows the type of connection between different
wireless modes. Mesh networks can be used without any wireless AP, but we
need to set up a computer with a wireless card based on the authentication that
is used in mesh points. Most of the wireless card drivers only support basic en-
cryption and basic authentication mechanisms such as WEP shared key, WPA,
and 802.1X. If some other authentication protocols such as EAP, RADIUS, TLS,
TTLS are needed, then additional software must be installed. For example, think
vantage access software is useful for wireless connections but it does not have any
authentication mechanism for WPA or RADIUS.
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Table 3.1: Types of network connections
Type of network Connection
Ad-hoc to ad-hoc “ad-hoc only can talk with ad-hoc” Yes
Ad-hoc to client No
Client to access point master Yes
Access point master to access point master No
Ad-hoc to access point master No
Client managed to client managed Yes
Figure 3.4: Wireless network connection modes
The hardware manufacturers usually provide specific drivers and software on-
line for each operating system to support ad-hoc authentication. For Intel comput-
ers the website: /www.intel.com/support/wireless/wlan/sb/cs-010623.htm is
very useful.
We also investigated VPN in a backbone wireless mesh network, and applied
OpenVPN but it is based on a central server and clients which cannot be imple-
mented in wireless mesh networks, because all the mesh routers have to connect
to the central router and pass the packets through that router. They also have to
generate key pairs for each client. A wireless router can never function as a cen-
tral server for this type of authentication due to resource limitations. Figure 3.5
illustrates the design of our backbone wireless mesh network using an implemen-
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tation of OpenVPN and an example of the key pairs generated is illustrated in
Appendix A.
Figure 3.5: Design of backbone wireless mesh network
TincVPN is another type of VPN supporting OpenWrt, OpenWrt kamikaze,
DD-WRT and Freifunk. It is open source and the packages are free available on the
Internet. The facilities and features of TincVPN which can support distributed au-
thentication and fragmentation of backbone wireless mesh networks is discussed in
Section 3.6. We proposed an implementation of TincVPN to the backbone wireless
mesh network as the best solution in respect of supporting wireless mesh networks
because (1) it does not require a central server, (2) it has strong encryption, (3) it
has dynamic authentication and (4) supports fragmentation. The configuration of
TincVPN and an example of its public and private keys are given in Appendix B.
3.5 Mesh firmware choices
Linksys Wrt54gl supports different types of firmware. We compared five different
types of firmware to identify those suitable for wireless mesh networks. A specific
requirement was that the software must have open source code, and must be able to
support authentication protocols that can be used in Wi-Fi mesh networks. These
mesh capabilities and security features are characterized in Table 4.1.
3.5.1 Wrt54gl default firmware:
The default firmware for Linksys routers allows several protocols for authentication
and encryption. It can act as a DHCP server, and it has a proper user interface,
but for extending the network to large areas, wireless devices to ad-hoc mode, i.e.
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peer-to-peer mode, is needed. This firmware does not support mesh networks. In
order to adapt it for wireless mesh networks, the Linksys firmware of the router
must be changed. Figure 3.6 illustrates the interface for Linksys Wrt54gl default
firmware.
Figure 3.6: Web page of Wrt54gl default firmware
3.5.2 OpenWrt firmware:
OpenWrt is Linux-based Linksys firmware that has four wireless modes: (1) client,
(2) client bridge, (3) ad-hoc and (4) AP. It has different authentication and en-
cryption protocols for each mode. WEP, WPA and WPA2 pre-shared keys are
available on client and client bridge mode. Only WEP is available for ad-hoc mode
but it does not support authentication. In the OpenWrt AP mode the following are
all available: WPA pre-shared key, WPA RADIUS, WEP, WPA2 pre-shared key
only, WPA RADIUS only, WPA2 pre-shared key mixed, WPA2 RADIUS mixed
and RADIUS. Figure 3.7 illustrates the interface for OpenWrt firmware.
3.5.3 Meshcom OpenAP firmware
Meshcom OpenAP is Linux-based firmware that provides limited security services.
Meshcom OpenAP currently supports three types of access management, namely,
Open, Closed, and a secure mode. In open mode the identity of the peer is not
checked and the link becomes automatically authenticated and everyone in the
coverage area can access the wireless network. In closed mode links are never
authenticated. In this mode, initially the fixed node is set up to use open authen-
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Figure 3.7: OpenWrt firmware web page
tication with all links. Secure remote password (SRP) protocol is used to verify
authorization of the parties by proving the mutual knowledge of a secret phrase or
key—pre-shared key authentication. In addition, a pair-wise master key (PMK) is
derived for link level encryption. Authentication mode can be set separately for dif-
ferent types of links by selecting a type other than “Default” from the pull down
Menu. Note that SRP authentication is not available for virtual links, because
SRP authentication requires a running Meshcom OpenAP mesh driver at both end
points.
Meshcom OpenAP supports user access management by setting an access
control list (ACL) in order to control which mesh nodes are allowed to communicate
with this fixed node. The access list may either be a white list—with only allowable
nodes in the list—or a blacklist—which allows all nodes except the listed nodes.
Nodes can easily be added or remove by using the interface. Figure 3.8 illustrates
the Meshcom OpenAP web page.
3.5.4 Freifunk firmware
Freifunk is Linux-based and open source firmware that has changeable source code
from which other versions can be developed. Freifunk firmware is an extension of
OpenWrt. Using this firmware, packages can be installed and configured from a list
of uninstalled packages. Details for installation and configuration are available on
the Freifunk webpage, as can be seen in Figure 3.9. All available Freifunk packages
can be viewed and the ones needed can be installed to the router. Freifunk firmware
has been localized in many languages. We have started localizing Freifunk into Dari.
 
 
 
 
57
Figure 3.8: The Meshcom OpenAP web page
Freifunk has three wireless modes namely: master access point, managed
client and ad-hoc mode. Freifunk can support closed networks as well, a list of IP
or MAC addresses can be blocked, and it also has a gateway filtering tool that can
filter all incoming and outgoing traffic.
Freifunk has OLSR routing to provide communication between other net-
work devices that are in wireless range, and have the same channel and the same
mode. In our research Openwrt-g-freifunk-1.7.4-en firmware for mesh routers
was used. Freifunk has several packages freely available on the Freifunk web site.
Figure 3.9: The Freifunk firmware web page
Its packages can be downloaded and installed on the router, followed by proper
configuration of the mesh network. Packages can be installed through ssh or the
command line user interface. With ssh, updating the list of available packages is
 
 
 
 
58
feasible and the packages can be installed faster than via the web interface. For
updating and installing the packages the following comments should be followed:
# ipkg update "update list of available packages"
# ipkg install "install this list of packages"
Providing Internet connections with a non hot spot wireless router that has
Freifunk firmware is not very difficult but it differs from the other firmware. OLSR
and HNA4 should be configured properly.
3.5.5 DD-WRT Firmware
DD-WRT is free Linux-based firmware with good security capabilities that provides
many encryption and authentication capabilities. DD-WRT supports EAP, WPA
pre-shared key, RADIUS, MAC filtering, IP address filtering, closed network, and
other protocols that are shown in Table 4.1. It also supports IPv6. It can use
RIPv2, BGP, OLSR, Tinc, AODV and OSPF as routing protocols. DD-WRT
works on different wireless modes such as ad-hoc, client, client bridge, and access
point mode. Figure 3.10 shows the interface of DD-WRT .
Figure 3.10: The DD-WRT firmware web page
In the African building a rural wireless mesh network project DD-WRT was
used in the non backbone wireless routers or APs (Johnson, 2007). They connected
two Linksys routers back-to-back where one of them works as a backbone wireless
mesh router that is connected to other mesh points in ad-hoc mode and the second
one is configured in AP mode for the easy connection of non mesh clients.
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3.6 Protocol modification
We addressed the first research question in Section 3.3–3.5 and Tables 4.1–4.2, in
this section and Section 4.2 we address the second research question. Section 3.4
describes our experiments that use five Linksys Wrt54gl routers and a laptop to
test the security and mesh features of firmware, to apply various wireless routing
protocols to test the capability and compatibility of authentication protocols for
Wi-Fi backbone mesh networks.
As a result of our attempts to adapt existing authentication protocols for
Wi-Fi backbone mesh and distributed fragmentated networks, we found that ex-
isting authentication protocols also characterized in Section 4.1 are not suitable or
applicable in a Wi-Fi backbone mesh network.
3.6.1 WPA upplicant
WPA supplicant is the supplicant for BSD or Windows client machines. WPA and
WPA2 need this supplicant for key negotiation and roaming of authentication and
association. WPA supplicant is licensed software and users are expected to abide
by the licensing terms. Thompson et al. also used WPA supplicant and EAP-edge
and Free RADIUS as an authentication server in their experimental network as
pointed out in Section 2.2.2 on Page 38. Free RADIUS is free software which can
be installed on the router and can be used for authentication. The router that is
loaded with Free RADIUS functions as the authentication server.
We tested several of wireless authentication protocols and chose WPA suppli-
cant to adapt EAP-edge, WPA with WPA supplicant and openssl to make them
compatible with fragmented backbone wireless mesh networks. We replaced the
EAP-TLS of the Freifunk WPA supplicant package to EAP-edge and combined it
in a Linux operating system. After modification of WPA supplicant we used a
cross compiler to compile the package and adapted the package to the Freifunk
format. We uploaded the package for the routers and tested it. The analysis and
results are described in Section 4.2.
3.6.2 OpenVPN and tincVPN
Our experiments revealed that only VPN can provide a secure connection for the
backbone of a wireless mesh network. In Section 2.2.1, we pointed out that Open-
VPN is free software available on Freifunk firmware. In this subsection we tested
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OpenVPN and TincVPN . We installed OpenVPN and tested it using six routers
and created a tunnel for a backbone Wi-Fi mesh network and exchanged keys
between routers. The results of our experiments are described in Section 4.2. Fig-
ure 3.11 shows the graphic interface of OpenVPN in Freifunk with the private and
public keys of the server. An example of some certificate keys is shown in detail
in Appendix A, and the results are described in Chapter 4. Figure 3.12 shows the
Figure 3.11: Interface for creating OpenVPN certificates
interface OpenVPN uses to create a certificate authority, a server key and client
key pairs based on RSA and Hellman parameters.
We tried TincVPN which supports distributed authentication on backbone
wireless mesh networks. We used six Linksys routers for TincVPN and installed
Tinc from the list of Freifunk packages. We created a tunnel for the experi-
mental Wi-Fi backbone mesh network. We configured the tinc.conf, tinc-up,
tinc-down and olsr.tinc. We introduced the IP address of virtual ports of the
routers to each other and we created public and private keys for each router and
exchanged the public keys. ping, traceroute, and the OLSR visualization soft-
ware was used for testing of connections. We detailed the TincVPN authentication
results in Chapter 4.
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Figure 3.12: Interface for creating RSA certificate authorities
3.7 Summary
This chapter described our research method. We discussed the security challenges
of Wi-Fi mesh networks in Section 3.1. Existing authentication protocols have
several problems such as centralization of authentication, several types of attack
and most of the existing authentication protocols do not support Wi-Fi mesh net-
works. We formulated two research questions based on the problems identified in
Section 3.2. Section 3.3 discussed our overall approach to try to discover authen-
tication mechanisms that address the problem of Wi-Fi mesh networks. We used
real wireless equipment instead of simulators to test existing authentication mech-
anisms and categorize them. Section 3.4 described our experimental infrastructure
and mesh Wi-Fi network for testing and identifying Wi-Fi authentication mecha-
nisms. In Section 3.5 we installed five types of firmware and tested them. After
analyzing 14 types of Wi-Fi authentication protocols in Chapter 4 and studying of
eight more Wi-Fi mesh network authentication protocols in Section 2.1 and Sec-
tion 3.6 described our attempts at modifying WPA supplicant and VPN to solve
the authentication problem for Wi-Fi backbone mesh networks.
Our results are analyzed in Chapter 4.
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Analysis
In this chapter we tabulate the data we previously collected and reviewed. The
comparison tables make it easy to read and understand the security capabilities
of the firmware and authentication protocols. Section 4.1 including Tables 4.1–4.2
answers the first research question and Sections 4.2–4.3 answer the second research
question with Tables 4.3–4.7.
4.1 Characterization of firmware and routing protocols
Wi-Fi mesh firmware and routing protocols are characterized and compared in
this section. Table 4.1 compares the security features and ad-hoc capability of five
types of firmware which we tested in the Linksys Wrt54gl routers using a real Wi-Fi
network, Table 4.2 characterizes the three types of Wi-Fi routing protocols.
4.1.1 Wrt54gl firmware
The right firmware choice determines the wireless mesh network and authentication
protocols that can be applied. We selected the Wrt54gl routers for our experimen-
tal network, because their firmware can be altered. Furthermore, the Wrt54gl open
source firmware is Linux-based and is freely available on the Internet. We tested
five types of Linksys Wrt54gl firmware, namely (1) the Linksys Wrt54gl default
firmware, (2) OpenWrt, (3) DD-WRT, (4) Freifunk firmware, and (5) Meshcom Ope-
nAP firmware. We characterized them to find the best one that has mesh network
capability and security features. See Table 4.1.
4.1.2 Wi-Fi mesh routing protocols
The selection of route and packet forwarding between mesh points needs a Wi-
Fi mesh network routing protocol that can find the route, select the best route
and send the packet through the best route. When selecting a protocol during
63
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Table 4.1: Comparison of Firmware
Security Features Name of firmware
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g
Linksys OpenWrt Meshcom Freifunk DD-WRT
MAC filter Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IP filter Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Closed network Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ACL No Yes Yes Yes Yes
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n
d
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en
-
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ca
ti
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n
WEP Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
WPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RADIUS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SRP No No Yes No No
Open Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
W
i-
F
i
m
o
d
e
Ad-hoc No Yes Yes Yes Yes
AP Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Client No Yes No No Yes
Client bridge No Yes No No Yes
Master access point No No No Yes No
Managed client No No No Yes No
the design of a Wi-Fi mesh network, it must be compatible with authentication
mechanism and have a low overhead. We characterized BATMAN, OLSR and
AODV in Section 1.1 on Pages 5–7. This comparison lead us to select OLSR as
an experimental wireless mesh network routing protocol, because: (1) it has less
overhead, than AODV; (2) it can support larger wireless networks, and (3) it has
good features for monitoring the networks. A team of developers in Afghanistan are
already working to localize this protocol with Freifunk for the OLPC project which
is being used in schools (OLPC, 2009). We installed both BATMAN and OLSR
and tested them on a real wireless mesh network, using the testbed of Abolhasan
et al. (2009).
Our characterization is discussed in Section 4.2. The testbed of M. Abol-
hasan (Abolhasan et al., 2009), and the performance analysis of BABEL by Juliusz
Chroboczek (2010) show that current wireless routing protocols have limitations—
they lack security, and suffer from slow convergence. Finding an efficient wireless
routing protocol still remains an open research problem.
4.2 Characterization of Wi-Fi authentication protocols
Analysis of existing protocols is very important to determine the most suitable
one for wireless mesh networks. To find the similarities, differences, capabilities
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Table 4.2: Comparison of wireless mesh network routing protocols
Protocol Pros Cons
A
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d
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V
ec
to
r
(A
O
D
V
)
–Works with critical hardware –Overhead in the network
–Works with low bandwidth –Higher latency to find the route
–Efficient in quality of services –No information about quality of
routes
–Performs better in networks with
static traffic
–Flooding of packets occurs when
searching for routes
O
p
ti
m
iz
ed
L
in
k
-
S
ta
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(O
L
S
R
)
–Reduces the overhead –Scalability is limited
–Used in high density environ-
ment
–Need enhanced hardware to
store entire routing table
–Higher routing efficiency –Slow convergence
–Low latency to find the router –Does not produce reliable and
secure routing
–Knows the quality of link
–Overhead independent of traffic
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(B
A
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-
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)
–Less network overhead –Slow convergence
–Simple route selection –Slow route selection and slow er-
ror checking
–Specially designed for Wi-Fi
mesh networks
–Possibility of routing loops
–It has good stability –No aggregation
–Possibility of collision
and limitations of different protocols we compared them. Tables 4.3–4.7 show a
detailed comparison of the existing protocols.
4.2.1 Basic user access control
Table 4.3 shows a list of features and limitations of basic user access management,
which we studied in Chapter 2.
The four access control mechanisms compared in Table 4.3 help us to control
user access and manage who can / cannot access the network. Each has its own
drawbacks, as discussed in Sections 2.1.1–2.1.14, and they can be used only in very
small networks.
4.2.2 WEP and WPA
Table 4.4 shows detailed comparisons of WEP, WPA and WPA2—it compares
different encryption methods, and shows that WEP has some security leaks such
as a short key, key management reply attack, and weak encryption methods. WPA
was developed to solve these problems of WEP—it supports a new encryption
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Table 4.3: Characterization of basic user access control
A
c
c
e
ss
c
o
n
tr
o
l
m
e
th
o
d
s
Pros Cons
C
lo
se
d
n
et
w
o
rk –Prevent from war driving –Interference to others
–Hide location of network –Clear text messages
–Only authorized know the SSID –Difficult to memorize the SSID
M
A
C
a
d
-
d
re
ss
fi
lt
er
-
in
g
–Easy to set up –Number of MAC addresses is limited
in most firmware
–Permit white list and deny black list –Attacker can easily spoof the MAC
address
–Wide hardware support –MAC must be set manually
S
h
ar
ed
ke
y
–Supports many of the IEEE 802.11
standards
–Vulnerable to inside and packet
spoofing attack
–Users need know the key –No mutual authentication
–WEP and WPA used for encryption –One shared key for all users
–It uses a four-way handshake authen-
tication
–When changing the key we must ad-
vertise it to all users
–It supports a wide range of hardware –Weak and deprecated authentication
U
se
r
ID
an
d
p
as
sw
or
d
au
-
th
en
ti
ca
ti
on
–All OSs support it –Vulnerable to dictionary attack
–Easy to setup and manage –Central server failure
–No need additional hardware –Weak security and plain text pass-
word
–It can be changed by user’s choice –Complexity of maintenance
algorithm that has good security features and it can also support the extensible
authentication protocol (EAP). Today WPA2 is very popular and is used on new
hardware that has all of the WPA security features.
WPA2 can be used with ad-hoc links which is very useful for wireless mesh
networks, since it has better security features than the two previous encryption
methods, but its management is more difficult than WEP and WPA. Encryption
and decryption between every mesh node takes time and adds to the overhead in
mesh nodes (Maple et al., 2006).
The WPA protocol can work in mesh networks. It uses the strong encryption
protocol namely AES and can also use the weaker TKIP. WPA supplicant is a
supplicant of WPA for the client side. The mesh point needs to work both as
client and server. We can use WPA with Free RADIUS as well.
There are four types of WPA, each with its pros and cons as shown in Ta-
ble 4.5. WPA supports dynamic authentication and encryption which is more
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Table 4.4: Comparison of WEP, WPA and WPA2
Features WEP WEP(802.11i)
WPA WPA2
Roles of calculation RC4 RC4 AES
Key Size 40 /104 bit 128 bits encryption
64 bits authentica-
tion
128 bits
Data integrity CRC-32 MIC CCMP
Header integrity None MIC CCMP
Key life 24 bit IV 48 bit IV 48 bit IV
Authentication Shared key PSK, RADIUS+
EAP
PSK, RADIUS+
EAP
Key management None EAP based EAP based
Reply to attack None IV sequence IV sequence
Dynamic en-
cryption and
authentication
None Yes Yes
useful for mesh networks and we can avoid administrator intervention.
Table 4.5: The pros and cons of WPA
Version of WPA Encryp-
tion
Authentication Pros Cons
WPA-personal TKIP PSK Easy to set up/
wide hardware
support
Weak encryption,
weak password and
vulnerable to attack
WPA-Enterprise TKIP RADIUS+EAP Robust authen-
tication
Weak encryption, re-
quire RADIUS setup
WPA2 personal AES PSK Easy to set up,
strong encryp-
tion
Weak password and
vulnerable to attack,
needs new hardware
WPA2-enterprise AES RADIUS+EAP Robust authenti-
cation and strong
encryption
Needs new hardware,
needs RADIUS setup
by default.
Table 4.5 summarizes our analysis and experiments and shows which WPA
is the most suitable authentication and encryption protocol for wireless mesh net-
works in respect of fragmentation and dynamic authentication. Unfortunately
WPA does not work in backbone wireless mesh networks because it is an OSI
link layer protocol. Furthermore, as described in Section 2.1.7 on Page 20, it is
vulnerable to a dictionary attack.
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4.2.3 Extensible authentication protocols
EAP is a protocol that is compatible with several other authentication protocols
and supports a wide range of hardware and software. It can be used for several
types of network. In this thesis we characterized and compared seven types of
Wi-Fi authentication protocols that are used over EAP. Table 4.6 and Table 4.7
show the characterization of EAP over seven other authentication protocols.
Table 4.6: Characterization of authentication protocols
Authenti-
cation
Pros Cons
EAP-IEEE
802.1X
–It is flexible with other protocols
–Gets help from upper layer protocols
–Uses four-way handshake authentication
–Is extensible to new protocols
–Has dynamic re-keying
–Single-hop authentication
–always needs another protocol to support authenti-
cation
–Physical port-based authentication
–Does not support wireless backbone
EAP-RADIUS –Works with different layers of the OSI model
–Can be used with different authentication protocols
–It uses UDP for fast data transmission
–Always needs a supporter for authentication
–It is a central server mechanism
–Does not support fragmentation
EAP-TLS –It is a mutual authentication protocol
–Supports link layer fragmentation
–Wide hardware and software support
–Resistant to attack
–Strong authentication
–Dynamic rekeying
–It is a point to point protocol
–Does not support Layer 3 authentication
–Needs client and server setup
–Increased maintenance cost
–Causes overhead in authentication time
EAP-TTLS –Has optional mutual authentication
–Dynamic rekeying
–Resistant to attack
–Strong authentication
–Mutual authentication causes removal of the packet
sequence number
–Can use less secure authentication such as MD5,
PAP and CHAP
EAP-MD5 –Password-based authentication
–Easy to implement
–Supports a wide range of hardware and software
–Vulnerable to several attacks
–Clashing hash values
–Slow reconnection
–No mutual authentication
–No self protection
EAP-LEAP –Dynamic rekeying
–Mutual authentication
–Symmetric key for data encryption
–Self protecting
–Cisco proprietary software
–Less device support
–Vulnerable to dictionary attack
–Slow reconnection
EAP-PANA –Supports multi-hop wireless networks
–Works on IP layer of OSI model
–It supports mutual authentication
–Fast reconnection
–Not resistant to attack
–Lease device support
–It is used in the IP layer which is still unsolved in
wireless mesh networks (Zhang et al., 2009).
This table was collated from (Gast, 2005, Page 656), (Dantu et al., 2007), and (Zhang et al., 2009, Page 280).
Characterization and comparison of authentication protocols illustrate that
current authentication protocols are not efficient and are unsuitable for secure con-
nection of Wi-Fi mesh networks and adapting and developing new authentication
protocols for multi-hop Wi-Fi mesh networks are still an open research question.
4.3 Analysis of Wi-Fi mesh network authentication
We did a deep literature review of Wi-Fi mesh network authentication. Selection
of the hardware and software was important for us to support the Wi-Fi mesh
network and have the facility of altering the code. We selected the Linksys Wrt54gl
router, because its firmware is changeable.
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We tested five types of firmware such as Linksys default firmware, OpenWrt,
DD-WRT, Meshcom OpenAP and Freifunk. We characterized the Wi-Fi mesh ca-
pability and security features of the mentioned firmware. We selected Freifunk for
our experimental network because it is open source firmware. Freifunk supports
mesh networks. It has already been used in the Village Telco project in South
Africa (Song, 2011) to provide low cost Internet and telephone access. Freifunk has
also been used in the OLPC project in Afghanistan schools (OLPC, 2009).
The Afghanistan ministry of education (MoE) has a strategic plan to imple-
ment the OLPC project to most Afghanistan schools to improve the computer skill
of students and provide then with Internet access. The secure connection between
ad-hoc points is still an open question. The MoE is faced with the problem of
securing network access, because they provide the bandwidth, which is limited,
and there is barely enough bandwidth to accommodate everyone and certainly not
enough to support bandwidth piracy due to the insecurity of access. The Village
Telco problem has to deal with similar problems (Song, 2011).
Based on our characterization of authentication protocols we found the fea-
tures and limitations of the existing authentication protocols. We tested the ex-
isting authentication protocols in a real network to determine if they work or not
and what the reason is if they do not work.
We divided the existing authentication protocols into several groups such
basic authentication mechanisms in Wi-Fi mesh networks, cryptographic protocols
Table 4.7: EAP over other protocols comparison table
EAP-802.1x EAP-RADIUS EAP-TLS EAP-TTLS EAP-MD5
Mutual Authentica-
tion
Yes Yes1 Yes Yes No
Identity privacy No (RFC 2486) Not enough pri-
vacy
No Yes No
Reply attack resis-
tance
No (RFC 3748) No Yes Yes No
Dictionary attack re-
sistance
Yes (RFC 3748) Not enough resis-
tance
Yes Yes No
Derivation of strong
session keys
Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Server Authentication User name, pass-
word and public key
User name, pass-
word
Public key cer-
tificate
Public key Certifi-
cate
None
Supplicant Authenti-
cation
User name, pass-
word and public key
User name, pass-
word
Public key Cer-
tificate
EAP,MS-
CHAP,CHAP
Password Hash
Dynamic key genera-
tion
Yes No Yes Yes No
Ease of deployment No Yes No No Yes
Over all security per-
formance
Related to security
protocol
Not enough secu-
rity
Good Good Poor
Software support Multiple Operating
system support
Multiple Operat-
ing system sup-
port
Multiple Operat-
ing system sup-
port
Multiple OS sup-
port, needs 802.11
Cisco wireless card
Multiple operating
system support
Wi-Fi mesh authenti-
cation
No No No No No
1 Mutual authentication can work between the supplicant and the AP, but it does not operate between the AP and the RADIUS
server.
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and extensible authentication protocols.
4.3.1 WPA and WPA supplicant
As a first step we selected WPA supplicant and WPA to modify and adapt it for
Wi-Fi mesh networks. Since WPA can support mutual authentication, dynamic
encryption and authentication, it can also support roaming profiles, and it supports
a wide range of hardware.
Because of the promising attributes of WPA we tried to adapt EAP-edge,
which originated from TLS to WPA supplicant, combined EAP-edge, and openssl
with the WPA supplicant package and used it with WPA. We combined them using
a cross compiler to generate firmware compatible with the Freifunk package, but we
could not successfully implement it because WPA supplicant only works in Layer
2 of the OSI model whereas ad-hoc network connections require network layer
protocols.
4.3.2 TincVPN
VPN is a public-private key based mechanism for securing connections in backbone
Wi-Fi mesh networks, and it supports the IP Layer of the OSI model. We used
OpenVPN but it did not work as pointed in Chapter 3, but TincVPN seems to be
a promising solution for Wi-Fi mesh networks.
OpenVPN is not suitable for mesh networks in respect of distributed authen-
tication and fragmentation. TincVPN supports encryption, distributed authenti-
cation and fragmentation. We used six routers for testing configurations and pair
keys configured according to the configuration described in Appendix B.
Figure 3.5 on Page 54 illustrates the concept of implementing of TincVPN
in backbone wireless mesh networks and fragmented wireless mesh networks.
Every mesh point in TincVPN can function as a gateway and the routing
can be handled by Tinc itself, which is interesting for our research. But if a mesh
point does not have a direct connection to the destination, the source will send the
packet through the route which is nearest to the destination. The policy routing
of Tinc is similar to the OSPF routing protocol.
During message exchange, mesh points, i.e. the routers, are aware only of
their directly connected neighbors whose public keys are known to them. Tinc
operates in the link layer and the IP layer. This characteristic of Tinc can be
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Figure 4.1: The TincVPN mesh point authentication process
applied to restrict the transmission of datagrams and frames.
Other wireless authentication protocols use the link layer of the OSI model
and cannot support secure backbone wireless mesh networks connecting via the IP
layer. So the link layer authentication protocols are not used for backbone wireless
mesh networks any more.
Two channels are used by Tinc UDP and TCP. UDP is mostly used for
carrying bulk data and TCP is used to carry some control data like key-exchange
and routing information.
The exchange message uses a sequence number to prevent mesh points from
attacks, because if two or more packages are received with same sequence number
it is a sign that the package is not normal and this sequence number also works as
an IV for Tinc .
Tinc also uses a traditional IV for the first block, but it is set at key-
generation time and is the same for every packet. Tinc uses a metaprotocol over
the TCP connection to exchange the control message between mesh points. Ta-
ble 4.8 shows the numeric value and description of messages which we use in this
 
 
 
 
72
Table 4.8: Types of messages
Value Message Purpose
0 ID host identification
1 Meta key keying material for metaconnection
2 Challenge authentication challenge
3 Challenge reply reply to authentication challenge
4 Ack acknowledgment of correction authentication
5 Status status string for logging
6 Error error notification
7 Temreq request to terminate connection
8 Ping keep-alive echo request
9 Pong keep-alive echo reply
10 Add subnet add a subnet to graph
11 Del subnet delete a subnet from graph
12 Add edge add a node (host) to graph
13 Del edge delete a node (host) from graph
14 Key changed node has changed its key
14 Req key request a node’s key
15 Ans key reply to key request
16 Packet TCP data packet length and data
chapter.
Tinc supports VPN using TincVPN software for providing an authentication
on wireless mesh networks, each mesh point behaves as a server and client simul-
taneously. Tinc exchanges six types of message from the start to the end of the
authentication process, which we illustrate in Figure 4.1.
At the end of the authentication protocol, each Tinc point will inform its
peer of all the other points and subnets that it knows about. As other points enter
and leave the VPN network, each Tinc point will likewise inform their peers about
the event.
Tinc uses openssl to provide encryption primitives but does not use the SSL
protocol itself. Tinc can use any of the encryption algorithms or hash methods
that openssl provides, so a Tinc user has a large variety of cryptographic systems
available. By default, Tinc uses Blowfish and SHA-1, but algorithms such AES is
also available.
As can be seen in Figure 4.1, the authentication protocol, after the ID mes-
sage, the peers exchange the keys they will use for metaprotocol encryption. There
are two criticisms of this procedure. First, each side determines its transmit key
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by itself, violating the rule that neither side should specify a key completely. On
the other hand, the key is used only to transmit data from the point that specified
it, so a point can’t be tricked into using a weak key by its peer, which is what
the rule is meant to prevent. That leaves open the possibility that one peer has a
weak random number generator, but because both sides use the openssl random
number generator, their results will most likely be similar.
The fact that UDP does not use the metaprotocol, and keys are encrypted in
raw bits, are some weaknesses of Tinc but they do not affect the security of Tinc.
4.4 Summary
The characterization and comparisons in Tables 4.1–4.2 answer the first research
question. This characterization led us to use Freifunk firmware in our experimen-
tal network since it is Linux-based and open source and used in several related
projects such the OLPC project in Afghanistan (OLPC, 2009), universities of
Afghanistan (MoHE Afghanistan, 2010), and rural wireless mesh network project
in South African (Johnson, 2007). Characterization of Wi-Fi mesh routing proto-
cols in Table 4.2 led us to select OLSR as routing protocols in our experimental
network.
Characterization and comparison of 14 types of authentication protocols
in Section 4.2 lead us to answer the second question. We found the limitation
and challenge of existing authentication protocols in the Wi-Fi mesh networks.
TincVPN is a very promising mechanism for backbone Wi-Fi mesh networks, it
can encrypt the data, support authentication, and we can fragment the Wi-Fi
mesh network. It works based on public key and private key and uses the openssl
library.
Next, Chapter 5 concludes the thesis by summarizing it and discusses the
results and conclusions and suggests future work.
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Conclusions
This chapter summarizes the thesis. The results and proposals for future work
are also covered. In Section 5.1, the thesis summary, covers the background, the
related work, the methodology, the results of the thesis and conclusion. Section 5.2
discusses the limitations of this research and future work is suggested in Section 5.3.
5.1 Thesis summary
Here we give a final synopsis of the entire thesis to conduct the reader briefly
through the entire contents of the thesis for a clearer understanding of the research.
We conclude by highlighting the results and limitations of this research, and with
a view to the future work, we address an approach to surmount the limitations to
assist other researchers in the field of authentication in wireless mesh networks.
5.1.1 Background
Wi-Fi networks are suitable for dense network coverage and we can extend Wi-
Fi networks to Wi-Fi mesh networks in very densely covered areas. Wi-Fi mesh
networks are cost effective but their access management remains a challenge (Lee
et al., 2008).
Section 1.1, besides introducing the thesis, describes wireless networks, wire-
less mesh networks and their types. Wi-Fi routing protocols such OLSR (Clausen
and Jacquet, 2003), BATMAN (Johnson et al., 2008), and AODV (Perkins et al.,
2003) are also covered in Section 1.1. Section 1.2 motivates the thesis. There were
several aspects we needed to study, namely, first, the efficiency of Wi-Fi mesh for
extending network accessibility, and second, the requirements of security and access
management of Wi-Fi mesh networks, based on the requirements of several Wi-Fi
mesh projects such as the Afghanistan OLPC initiative (OLPC, 2009), and the
Afghanistan universities wireless network (MoHE Afghanistan, 2010), the Village
Telco project in the Bo-kaap (Song, 2011), and the South African wireless mesh
network (Johnson, 2007). Section 1.3 covers the research questions. Section 1.4
75
 
 
 
 
76
explains the research methodology and finally Section 1.5 outlines the entire thesis.
5.1.2 Related Work
Chapter 2 on related work covers Wi-Fi infrastructure network authentication
mechanisms and Wi-Fi mesh network authentication protocols and has two main
parts, namely, 802.11 authentication mechanisms in Section 2.1 and Wi-Fi mesh
network authentication in Section 2.2.
Section 2.1 covers 14 types of authentication protocols that are used in Wi-
Fi infrastructure networks, such as closed networks in Section 2.1.1, MAC ad-
dress filtering in Section 2.1.2, password authentication in Section 2.1.3, challenge-
handshake authentication protocol in Section 2.1.4, shared key authentication Sec-
tion 2.1.5, wired equivalent privacy in Section 2.1.6, Wi-Fi protected access in
Section 2.1.7, Wi-Fi protected access II in Section 2.1.8, extensible authentica-
tion protocol in Section 2.1.9, EAP-remote authentication dial in user service in
Section 2.1.10, EAP-transport layer security in Section 2.1.11, EAP-tunnel trans-
port layer security in Section 2.1.12, EAP-message design 5 in Section 2.1.13, and
lightweight extensible authentication protocol in Section 2.1.14. They only sup-
port single-hop Wi-Fi networks and other protocols must be used for Wi-Fi mesh
networks.
The security of Wi-Fi multi-hop networks is much more complicated than Wi-
Fi single hop networks because their architecture is unstable and is under continual
change. Access control of mesh networks has distribution problems and central
devices have a performance overhead. Wi-Fi mesh points moving from one location
to another need to have access to the network all the time and everywhere (Lee
et al., 2008).
Section 2.2 discusses Wi-Fi mesh network authentication protocols in two
parts, under (1) central authentication mechanisms such as IEEE-802.1X (Cheikh-
rouhou et al., 2006), PANA (Khan and Akbar, 2006) and OpenVPN (Snader, 2007),
and under (2) distributed authentication mechanisms such as URSA (Luo et al.,
2004), EAP-AGE (Thompson et al., 2007), distributed authentication and key
management (Husseiki, 2006), TincVPN (Tinc, 1998), and distributed authenti-
cating mechanisms for Wi-Fi mesh networks proposed by several researchers such
as Luo et al. (2004), Thompson et al. (2007), and by Lee et al. (2008).
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5.1.3 Methods
We studied 14 types of Wi-Fi and eight more types of Wi-Fi mesh networks in
Chapter 2 in Sections 2.1.1–2.1.14 and in Section 2.2. Chapter 3 on methods
discusses the security challenges of Wi-Fi mesh networks in Section 3.1 where
several challenges are pointed out. The security challenges prompted us to do this
research and we organized the thesis around two research questions in Section 3.2.
We designed experimental real Wi-Fi and Wi-Fi mesh networks in Section 3.4.
The selection of firmware was covered in Section 3.5, based on the testing of five
types of Linksys Wrt54gl firmware such as the Linksys default firmware, DD-WRT,
Meshcom OpenAP, OpenWrt, and Freifunk were tested in this section. We also tested
three types of Wi-Fi routing protocols such as OLSR, AODV, and BATMAN in
Section 3.5.
After studying Wi-Fi and Wi-Fi authentication protocols in Chapter 2 and
analyzing authentication protocols in Section 3.6 we attempted to modify the
WPA supplicant protocol and adapted it with EAP-AGE and tried use with WPA
for Wi-Fi mesh networks. The analysis and results of this are discussed in Chap-
ter 4 and Chapter 5.
5.1.4 Results
The empirical study was important to gain a deeper understanding of Wi-Fi mesh
networks and their features and challenges.
We used Linksys Wrt54gl routers because we had access to the code for the
firmware and we could use Linux-based open source firmware such as OpenWrt, DD-
WRT, Meshcom OpenAP, Open AP, and Freifunk. The testing and characterization
of five types of firmware in Section 4.1 was important to enable us to find the
best one to support Wi-Fi mesh networks with adequate security features. We
selected Freifunk firmware because its firmware is open source. Freifunk supports
mesh networks. It is already being used in the Village Telco project (Song, 2011) in
South African which provides Internet and telephone network access at a low cost.
Freifunk is also used in the OLPC project in Afghanistan schools, where based on
the MoE in Afghanistan’s strategic plan, the OLPC initiative will be implemented
in most of Afghanistan schools to improve the computer skills of students and
provide them with Internet access (OLPC, 2009).
We analyzed three Wi-Fi routing protocols such as OLSR (Clausen and
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Jacquet, 2003), AODV (Perkins et al., 2003) and BATMAN (Johnson et al., 2008)
in Table 4.2, and we selected OLSR (Clausen and Jacquet, 2003), because it is
an open source wireless mesh network routing protocol with a low overhead. It
can support larger wireless networks. It has good features for the monitoring of
networks, and Freifunk has a complete and compatible package to support OLSR.
The Afghanistan OLPC initiative has a team that is localizing the Freifunk OLSR
package to support Dari and Pashto (OLPC, 2009). Based on our characterization
in Table 4.2 and Abulhasan’s analysis (Abolhasan et al., 2009) developing a secure
routing protocol for Wi-Fi mesh networks remains an open question.
The connections between ad-hoc points needs to be secured otherwise unau-
thorized users can access to the network. We characterized and compared 14 types
of authentication protocols in Tables 4.3–4.7 to find the best option for access
management and securing connections in Wi-Fi mesh networks. We tested the
authentication protocols on five types of firmware in real mesh networks in Chap-
ter 3 also we studied eight more authentication protocols related to this thesis in
Section 2.2. We analyzed the authentication protocols in Chapter 4. The Wi-Fi
ad-hoc network designed to be accessible for everyone and our analysis in Chap-
ter 4, the analysis of Abolhasan et al. (2009) shows that the existing authentication
protocols are not able to secure the backbone of Wi-Fi ad-hoc networks because
most of them use OSI Layer 2 protocols and our aim was to secure the backbone
of Wi-Fi mesh networks which rely on OSI Layer 3 protocols.
EAP-TTLS over PANA proposed by Khan and Akbar (2006) seems a promis-
ing authentication protocol, because PANA works on Layer 3 of OSI model and
it supports multi-hop wireless networks, however, it requires a central server that
restricts the extension of Wi-Fi mesh network. For backbone Wi-Fi mesh networks
the routers are required to function simultaneously as client and server.
Wi-Fi mesh networks are extensible networks that grow over time. Several re-
searchers such as (Khan and Akbar, 2006; Lee et al., 2008) proposed distributed au-
thentication mechanisms to prevent overloading the central authentication server.
We tried to adapt EAP-AGE with WPA supplicant as proposed by Thomp-
son et al. (2007) and mentioned in Section 3.6 to localize the authentication and
avoid Internet authentication. We tried to use it for distributed authentication,
but we were not able to get the network to work using distributed authentication
and fragmentation, because WPA supplicant only works in OSI Layer 2 and we
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need to secure the network layer.
The existing authentication is not able to provide distributed authentication
in respect of fragmentation, because we propose VPN for the backbone wireless
mesh networks—it should be able to provide distributed authentication and frag-
ment the backbone wireless mesh networks. Our experiments revealed that only
VPN can provide a secure connection for the backbone of a wireless mesh network.
In Section 2.2.1 we pointed out that OpenVPN is free software available on Freifunk
firmware. We installed OpenVPN and described our tests in Chapter 3 using six
routers. Based on our tests OpenVPN is not a suitable access management mecha-
nism for Wi-Fi mesh networks because one VPN can secure the link between only
two nodes per tunnel, and if we must secure all the links then we need a key pair for
each link. This is difficult to achieve on a network with many nodes since the cen-
tral server needs to store the public key of every node connected to it, overloading
the central server.
We tested TincVPN on the backbone wireless mesh network and it seems to
be the best solution that supports Wi-Fi backbone mesh networks because (1) it
does not require a central server, (2) it has strong encryption, (3) it has dynamic
authentication and (4) it supports fragmentation. The configuration of TincVPN
is shown in Appendix B on Page 93 and an example of the public and private keys
are given in Appendix B on Page 97. Finally, based on our experiments TincVPN
is the best solution for backbone Wi-Fi mesh network. However, EAP-TTLS over
PANA also can be used for smaller Wi-Fi mesh networks.
5.1.5 Conclusion
Wi-Fi mesh networks are extensible and promising networks in high density areas,
but the security of Wi-Fi mesh network is still a big challenge (Akyildiz and Wang,
2005). Several routing protocols exist that can help to connect mesh points in Wi-
Fi mesh networks (Johnson et al., 2008), but there are no security mechanisms for
connecting mesh points. In Chapter 2 the existing authentication protocols are
categorized into two major groups. Authentication protocols that work only in
single-hop Wi-Fi networks and authentication protocols that work in Wi-Fi mesh
networks.
Wi-Fi ad-hoc networks were designed and tested experimentally with various
Wi-Fi authentication protocols. We found several limitations of authentication
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protocols by applying them to Wi-Fi mesh networks.
In Chapter 4 we characterized the 14 types of authentication protocols besides
studying eight other related Wi-Fi mesh authentication mechanisms. TincVPN
seems a promising mechanism for backbone Wi-Fi mesh networks as detailed in
Chapter 4.
The existing authentication protocols are designed to work at the OSI link
layer. We tried to find an authentication solution for backbone Wi-Fi mesh net-
works. PANA, designed for the IP layer of Wi-Fi networks is based on a central
server, but that is unsuitable for distributed mesh networks. We propose using
TincVPN as the way forward because it supports distributed authentication, frag-
mentation of the networks, supports the IP layer of the OSI model and enables a
secure mesh mesh authentication mechanism.
5.2 Limitations
TincVPN provides encryption, distributed authentication, and fragmentation of the
network, and seems a promising security mechanism, but it has some limitations,
which are summarized as follows.
1. Figure 5.1, shows a screen shot of our implementation of an experimental
Figure 5.1: TincVPN connections
network to test TincVPN in a Wi-Fi mesh network. Routers R1, R2, R6 and
R3 are connected and send the packets to each other through unsecure wire-
less ports. The same routers also have another virtual port or tunnel that
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are created by TincVPN, but they are only connected through wireless ports,
and packets are not forwarded through the secure tunnel despite the config-
uration files, IP tables, OLSR settings and firewall configurations. Applying
traceroute and ping show that they packets are forwarded through wireless
ports that are insecure in ad-hoc mode. This demonstrates that TincVPN
still needs some improvement.
2. The manual exchange of public keys for mesh points are time consuming and
needs a lot of network administrator intervention.
3. It causes overload in the devices, since they have to hold the keys of all the
mesh points that are part of the mesh network.
5.3 Future work
VPN is a good solution for securing the connections of the backbone Wi-Fi mesh
network, but it should support multi-hop mesh points. It must support distributed
authentication and it must support network fragmentation. TincVPN is uses pub-
lic and private keys, supports distributed authentication and fragmentation and
supports multi-hop mesh points where each of the mesh points behave as client
and server at the same time.
Figure 5.2: Fragmentation with TincVPN
If we want to implement TincVPN we have to exchange the public keys of the
routers on all mesh points included the network. Figure 5.2 illustrates the concept
of implementation of TincVPN in Wi-Fi backbone mesh networks.
 
 
 
 
82
There are two groups of routers in Figure 5.2. Six routers are in the first
group and six routers are in the second group and there are only two connections
between the two groups. All the routers which are in the one group must share
their public keys with each other and only one of them has to share the public
key with one of other routers in the second group. In order to introduce some
redundancy to prevent a bottleneck more than one connection between the groups
of routers can be introduced. We tried this setting but as we did not have more
time to work on this research we couldn’t connect the routers through a tunnel,
and we faced some problems in the IP security protocol because it did not allow
the routing protocol to send or receive the packets through the tunnel. So we
suggest using TincVPN for securing the connection between backbone routers and
fragment the network to spread the load of routers. It can provide distributed
authentication by default.
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Appendix A
Certificate keys generated with
openVPN
A.1 R1 CA.crt
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----------END CERTIFICATE-----
A.2 R1 SERVER.crt
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIICrjCCAhegAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADAjMREwDwYDVQQKEwhGcmVp
ZnVuazEOMAwGA1UEAxQFUjFfQ0EwHhcNMTEwMTA0MTM1NDQ2WhcNMjEwMTAxMTM1
NDQ2WjAnMREwDwYDVQQKEwhGcmVpZnVuazESMBAGA1UEAxQJUjFfU0VSVkVSMIGf
MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDDRdNC3vcVUdCBhiggi3O4ZzOnC416
F/h2kQYnLGkyV5C6yRd/7LAnlxkA2YyZbSaT9z2q4XiVG+Nuh9sfDNIhCI6xqvhv
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92-----END CERTIFICATE-----
A.3 R1 SERVER.key
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----------END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
 
 
 
 
Appendix B
Configuration and certificate keys for
TincVPN
B.1 Setting up Freifunk
Following are the step for server:
#ipkg update
#ipkg install tinc
#mkdir -p /etc/tinc/R3/hosts
#vim /etc/tinc/tinc.conf
# Symbolischer Name f?r diese Verbindung. (nur alphanumerische Werte und der _ s
Name = R3
# Mit welchen anderen Tinc-Daemons soll sich bei Programmstart verbunden werden.
# Entsprechende Host-Konfiguation Dateien in "hosts/" m?ssen vorhanden sein.
ConnectTo = R1
ConnectTo = R2
Device = /dev/net/tun
# Name des Tunnelinterfaces, der vergeben werden soll z.B. tun0
Interface = tinc0
AddressFamily = ipv4
Hostnames = yes
Mode = switch
PrivateKeyFile = /etc/tinc/R3/rsa_key.priv
PingTimeout = 30
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We write the script of tinc up and down:
Vim/etc/tinc/R3/tinc-Down
======================================================
iptables -D INPUT -i $WANDEV -p udp --dport $TINCPRT -j ACCEPT
iptables -D INPUT -i $WANDEV -p tcp --dport $TINCPRT -j ACCEPT
# Input / Output auf dem Tinc-Interface verbieten
iptables -D INPUT -d $WIFIADR -i $TINCDEV -j ACCEPT
iptables -D INPUT -d $TINCADR/$TINCPRE -j ACCEPT
iptables -D OUTPUT -s $WIFIADR -o $TINCDEV -j ACCEPT
iptables -D OUTPUT -s $TINCADR/$TINCPRE -j ACCEPT
# Weiterleitungen zwischen Wifi- und Tinc-Interface verbieten
iptables -D FORWARD -i $WIFIDEV -o $TINCDEV -j ACCEPT
iptables -D FORWARD -i $TINCDEV -o $WIFIDEV -j ACCEPT
# Weiterleitungen zwischen LAN- und Tinc-Interface verbieten
iptables -D FORWARD -i $LANDEV -o $TINCDEV -m state --state NEW,RELATED,ESTABLIS
iptables -D FORWARD -i $TINCDEV -o $LANDEV -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED
# LAN-Nat-Regel l?schen
iptables -t nat -D POSTROUTING -o $TINCDEV -s $LANNET/$LANPRE -j MASQUERADE
# Interface dekonfigurieren
ip addr del $TINCADR/$TINCPRE brd $TINCBRC dev $TINCDEV
===========================================================
Vim/etc/tinc/R3/tinc-up
#/bin/sh
#this file is for tinc startup
# Start of configuration --
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TINCPRT=655
TINCADR=10.1.1.1 # <-- IP is the network address of router")
TINCBRC=10.1.1.255
TINCPRE=24
TINCDEV=$INTERFACE
#TINCDEVhost=10.1.1.3/24
# --end of configuration --
# Network load parameters
eval $(/usr/bin/netparam)
# Tinc Interface configuration
ip addr add $TINCADR/$TINCPRE brd $TINCBRC dev $TINCDEV
# Input to tinc permit from the WAN port
iptables -I INPUT -i $WANDEV -p udp --dport $TINCPRT -j ACCEPT
iptables -I INPUT -i $WANDEV -p tcp --dport $TINCPRT -j ACCEPT
# input/output interface on tinc
iptables -I INPUT -d $WIFIADR -i $TINCDEV -j ACCEPT
iptables -I INPUT -d $TINCADR/$TINCPRE -j ACCEPT
iptables -I OUTPUT -s $WIFIADR -o $TINCDEV -j ACCEPT
iptables -I OUTPUT -s $TINCADR/$TINCPRE -j ACCEPT
# redirect between Wi-Fi and tinc interface allow
iptables -I FORWARD -i $WIFIDEV -o $TINCDEV -j ACCEPT
iptables -I FORWARD -i $TINCDEV -o $WIFIDEV -j ACCEPT
# forwarding between LAN and tinc interface allow
iptables -I FORWARD -i $LANDEV -o $TINCDEV -m state --state NEW,RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
iptables -I FORWARD -i $TINCDEV -o $LANDEV -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
# LAN netting direction of tinc
iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o $TINCDEV -s $LANNET/$LANPRE -j MASQUERADE
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# active interface
ip link set dev $TINCDEV up
for shutdown of tinc VPN:
root@R1:/etc/tinc/R1# vim tinc-down
#!/bin/sh
# This file closes down the tunnel device und removes corresponding firewall rules.
# --Start of configuration--
TINCPRT=655
TINCADR=10.1.1.0 # <-- ip should customize!
TINCBRC=10.1.1.255
TINCPRE=24
TINCDEV=$INTERFACE
# --End of configuration --
# Network load parameters
eval $(/usr/bin/netparam)
# Tinc interface configuration
ip link set $TINCDEV down
# Input to the tinc band from the WAN port
iptables -D INPUT -i $WANDEV -p udp --dport $TINCPRT -j ACCEPT
iptables -D INPUT -i $WANDEV -p tcp --dport $TINCPRT -j ACCEPT
# Input / Output interface ban in tinc
iptables -D INPUT -d $WIFIADR -i $TINCDEV -j ACCEPT
iptables -D INPUT -d $TINCADR/$TINCPRE -j ACCEPT
iptables -D OUTPUT -s $WIFIADR -o $TINCDEV -j ACCEPT
iptables -D OUTPUT -s $TINCADR/$TINCPRE -j ACCEPT
# forwarding between Wifi interface and tinc interface ban
 
 
 
 
97
iptables -D FORWARD -i $WIFIDEV -o $TINCDEV -j ACCEPT
iptables -D FORWARD -i $TINCDEV -o $WIFIDEV -j ACCEPT
# forwarding between LAN and tinc interface ban
iptables -D FORWARD -i $LANDEV -o $TINCDEV -m state --state NEW,RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
iptables -D FORWARD -i $TINCDEV -o $LANDEV -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
# LAN-Nat-role delete
iptables -t nat -D POSTROUTING -o $TINCDEV -s $LANNET/$LANPRE -j MASQUERADE
# Interface unconfigure
ip addr del $TINCADR/$TINCPRE brd $TINCBRC dev $TINCDEV
We created a private key and a public key for the server and clients:
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- 
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fOWlLtEg9mYtPaFOpY7VNtECgYBOYlG2alL7whiVfVdxIOo8kfZX3xLmKLBsvuo6
Ish2n7q5ebmPZM7h6jmCkPtop/8MmepFKXLAPCHsmlYoRsjAPF1LNOqxavEjyosT
kwo3WoldVlMyEC6Jxa8pzvnT8EjCVkreFtZADPX25AtXOUfrJnBqIIJLZgDI1AO/
f8el+QKBgQDvr+bpoSh4Kf/sQCzm6yj4gGiE0PDnBhU2Z4fGMtNGKwRnVpaVt6kD
iYXV90tsQSsWpkd5ZNGHQCLbKiWDZarBHVnmMOpjiTgF47KCMjg20W+TGkNJH7z3
gKfyhyPHP36m4WPZazUQwepXNwr5KvBOVdiaVhxybeUleLv305v5jA==
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
compression=9
subnet=10.1.1.0/24
address=10.1.1.1
-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
MIIBCgKCAQEA3z3fXVFp9G3tJcakcmUB7yuogH7rtHSTPxnUbx3HWAXLeM9lBXJ3
ztKH0Ht06SlIXmoAwPEU66CARajqLeFrrK8ZV+JUbXH9lnP2q2wlgdhnBDhPm2q9
mTe8L3WZ+yAdcyDil8PbbKa3UQ6micvA6EL3mOEP0+oJ+X0SaocGInk5k4Pl49Y+
OxxuaGvJca+TaQs6DRyr+2+WqLwaNhXiNb5nf6jtgXXDFQmEwxPFfxhN9NLIPEiz
zgQ+c0UwmBAIVjs5YztEaB1zXS26c/N4MWX8BkIACj3jrwiwVWa7Z2+BaDAbF8JF
KCflzbmA4Z9tpIIMJLlumQ8k9JXbcuHLtQIDAQAB
-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
 
 
 
 
